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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969 the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case
Shapiro v. Thompson.2 In Shapiro, the Court addressed the constitution-
ality of the statutes of several states that denied all welfare assistance to
residents who had not lived in the state for one year.3 Such statutes are
known as "durational residence requirements."4
Durational residence requirements impose a waiting period on new
residents prior to their receipt of some benefit or entitlement-in this
case, welfare aid.' However, these waiting periods are not tests of bona
fide residency-that is, whether an individual is or is not a resident of the
state.' Instead, durational residence requirements are imposed on indi-
2. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3. Id. at 622. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Shapiro, see infra part II.B.
4. This Comment uses the terms "waiting period" and "durational residence require-
ment" interchangeably.
5. Nationally, welfare aid consists primarily of the federally backed Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), created by the Social Security Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-
609 (amended 1968), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, id. §§ 1351-1355
(1950) (amended 1981). Rounding out the federal program is Aid to the Blind, id. §§ 1201-
1206 (1935) (amended 1981), and Old Age Assistance, id. §§ 301-306 (1935) (amended 1981).
Of these four programs, AFDC is by far the dominant category. Indigents may also be eligible
for state general assistance, which every state maintains. Indigent individuals are also eligible
for other programs such as food stamps, medical assistance, vocational rehabilitation, and
housing assistance. This Comment uses the terms "welfare," "welfare funds," and "welfare
aid" interchangeably to mean any of the above programs, and does not distinguish between
them. However, AFDC and state general assistance are the primary sources of welfare aid to
indigents that are denied by durational residence requirements.
Note, however, that the term "welfare" as used in this Comment does not include "social
security" payments, which, unlike welfare, are based on past contributions.
6. The Court has noted:
We have always carefully distinguished between bona fide residence requirements,
which seek to differentiate between residents and nonresidents, and residence require-
ments, such as durational, fixed date, and fixed point residence requirements, which
treat established residents differently based on the time they migrated into the
State .... "A bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly
applied, furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for
its residents are enjoyed only by residents. Such a requirement [generally] does not
burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate travel, for any person is free
to move to a State and to establish residence there. A bona fide residence require-
ment simply requires that the person does establish residence before demanding the
services that are restricted to residents."
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viduals who by definition already are residents of the state.' Thus, dura-
tional residence requirements serve to group bona fide state residents into
two categories: those who have been residents for the specified period of
time and those who have not.
The Court in Shapiro used the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment' to strike down these types of statutes.9 The Court
held that durational residence requirements impermissibly burden the
right to travel,10 which-though not explicitly mentioned in the Consti-
tution-has been found to be a fundamental right.11
Following the Shapiro decision in 1969, state residence requirements
for receipt of welfare aid soon disappeared-either being quickly struck
down by the courts, or by falling into nonenforcement. For some twenty
years following Shapiro, the issue of durational residence requirements-
at least as applied to welfare aid-seemed settled. 2 Today, however, the
specter of residence requirements for welfare aid has resurfaced. Some
states have revived old residence requirements for welfare aid 3 or have
enacted, or are attempting to enact, new ones.14 These statutes are often
in bold defiance of Shapiro, 5 having been enacted with the express inten-
tion of deterring interstate migration of indigent individuals in order to
prevent the state from becoming a "welfare magnet."' 6
In a 1989 case Judge Tinder of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana addressed the first court challenge to
this resurgence of state durational residence requirements for receipt of
Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 US. 898, 903 n.3 (1986) (quoting Martinez v. Bynum, 461
U.S. 321, 328-29 (1983)).
7. Id.
8. The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Shapiro, 394 US. at 633; see infra part II.B.
10. Shapiro, 394 US. at 633; see infra part II.B. This Comment, though truly focused on
the right to migrate, bows to conventional terminology and continues to use the more impre-
cise "right to travel" interchangeably with "right to migrate." The long history of the doctrine
makes a change at this point beyond this Author's ability to correct.
11. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
12. Durational residence requirements continued in other areas. See infra part II.C.
13. See infra note 223.
14. See Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the States: The Bush Legacy, Focus (U.
Wis., Madison), Spring 1993, at 18, 23-25. These states include Illinois and Wyoming, as well
as California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Indiana. Id. at 23-24; see infra part IV.B.
15. For example, California Governor Pete Wilson has stated that he feels Shapiro and its
progeny are wrongly decided. Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Favors Wait for Welfare, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1991, at A3. He supported the enactment of California's current durational
residence requirement. Ial The California statute, however, has since been declared unconsti-
tutional. See infra notes 258-74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra part III.A for an analysis of this theory.
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welfare aid in his memorandum opinion in Eddleman v. Center Town-
ship.17 The court in Eddleman applied the "old and well-established"
rule laid down in Shapiro 18 and held unconstitutional an Indiana dura-
tional residence requirement that required three years of continuous state
residence and one year of continued county residence prior to receipt of
aid.19 In Eddleman, both parties agreed that "strict scrutiny" applied.2"
Though with this agreement the case could have been disposed of by
consent decree,21 Judge Tinder felt that his memorandum would prevent
future constitutional violations and obviate "the need for attorneys and
the federal bench to revisit an area of law that is by now well-
travelled."22
Unfortunately, Judge Tinder's memorandum opinion only serves to
highlight the fact that this area, though well-travelled, is far from well-
settled.23 Attorneys and the federal bench have revisited and will con-
tinue to revisit this area of the law.2 4 In fact, Eddleman highlights the
very core of the problem: When does a durational residence requirement
for welfare penalize the right to travel and thus trigger strict scrutiny,
and when does it not?25
This ambiguity is the target of the new state residence requirements.
States trying today to enact durational residence requirements have at-
tempted to distinguish their new laws by making them "less onerous"
than the statutes at issue in Shapiro -hoping to thereby avoid strict scru-
17. 723 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
18. Id at 87.
19. Id. at 89 n.8; see infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
20. Eddleman, 723 F. Supp. at 87; see infra note 220 and accompanying text.
21. Eddleman, 723 F. Supp. at 87.
22. Id.
23. In fairness to Judge Tinder, the Eddleman case was so factually similar to Shapiro that
stare decisis demanded that strict scrutiny apply and that the statute fail. When a statute is so
factually similar to Shapiro, that result is well-settled. However, the issue of when durational
residence requirements that differ factually from those at issue in Shapiro is anything but well-
settled.
24. Since Eddleman, three other cases have considered the right to travel, Green v. An-
derson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992); see infra part IV.B.
25. Judge Scirica very recently made a similar observation in Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d
1262 (3d Cir. 1992), where the right to travel was implicated, but no issue of residence require-
ment was involved. Judge Scirica noted: "The Supreme Court has yet to articulate why it has
applied rational basis review in some right to travel cases and strict scrutiny in others, except
to say that where a law cannot meet the minimum rationality requirement there is no need to
undertake a more searching inquiry." Id. at 1267.
[Vol. 27:305
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tiny review.26 Thus, the states are attempting to walk the line of strict
scrutiny.
This gamesmanship has led to diverse judicial results. Including
Eddleman, four cases since 1989 have addressed these new durational
residence requirements.27 In three of the four cases, the statutes at issue
have been found unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny standard.2" In
one case, Jones v. Milwaukee County,29 the court applied rational basis
review and found the challenged statute constitutional.30 However, in
none of these cases did a court lay out logical parameters for determining
when strict scrutiny is triggered and when it is not.3"
This Comment attempts to define when durational residence re-
quirements for welfare aid penalize the right to travel, and how well
those requirements will fare under both strict scrutiny and rational basis
review. Part II reviews the right to travel, because its lengthy and convo-
luted history has only compounded the problem of defining the parame-
ters of strict scrutiny in these cases.32 Part III addresses some of the
assumptions and problems inherent to welfare, which complicate any
analysis of the new durational residence requirement statutes, including
the idea of the state as a "welfare magnet.",33 Part IV categorizes the
various new state statutes34 to determine if any or all of these statutes
should trigger and could survive strict scrutiny,35 or, in the event strict
scrutiny is avoided, to consider whether the statutes could survive even
rational basis review. 36 Finally, part V concludes that, despite the states'
attempts to distinguish their durational residence requirements from
those at issue in Shapiro, the statutes are unconstitutional under either
strict scrutiny or rational basis review.3 7
26. See, e.g., James N. Baker et al., Welfare Migrants: A Cold Shoulder in Wisconsin,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1989, at 23 (Wisconsin governor believes since benefits reduced, not
denied, new statute can circumvent Shapiro).
27. See supra note 24; infra part IV.B.
28. Green, 811 F. Supp. at 521; Eddleman, 723 F. Supp. at 89-91; Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at
903-04; see infra part IV.B.
29. 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992); see infra part IV.B.2.
30. Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 25-26.
31. See infra part IV.B.
32. See infra part II.
33. See infra part III.
34. See infra part IV.A.
35. See infra part IV.B.
36. See infra part IV.C.
37. See infra part V.
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A. The Early Right to Travel
The ability to travel freely has been one of the formative and defin-
ing elements of the American experience. 3 Even prior to recognition of
the right as fundamental in the United States, the right to travel had a
long history.39 Though mentioned in the Articles of Confederation,' the
Constitution does not explicitly mention the right to travel.41 Neverthe-
38. See FREDERICK J. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
39. The Magna Carta mentioned the guarantee of free passage "into and out of the realm."
MAGNA CARTA ch. 42 (1215). William Blackstone's Commentaries also proclaimed a right to
travel, including in his list of rights "the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, of mov-
ing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment
or restraint, unless by due course of law." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
40. The Articles of Confederation provide that "[t]he people of each state shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other state." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV,
para. 1 (1781). See infra part III.B for the historical nexus between the right to travel and
indigent individuals.
41. Article IV of the Constitution, which is generally believed to incorporate article IV of
the Articles of Confederation, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 185-86 (1st ed. 1956), does not specifically mention a right to
travel. Id. at 162. Rather, it guarantees in general terms the "privileges and immunities" of
citizenship in the various states. Article IV of the Constitution states simply: "the Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
US. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
The omission of specific mention of the right to "free ingress and regress" presents two
potential interpretations: First, that travel was no longer an important constitutional princi-
ple, or, second, that the right to travel was so basic a building block to the stronger union
forged by the Constitution that its inclusion was superfluous. CHAFEE, supra, at 185. "Here,
of course, the first interpretation is impossible.... So only the second interpretation is tenable.
The reason for not expressly giving 'free ingress and regress' across state lines must be that it is
in the Constitution, somewhere else." Id. The Supreme Court later specifically adopted this
interpretation. United States v. Guest, 383 US. 745, 757-58 (1966).
The failure of the Constitution to mention the right to travel has been the main problem
scholars and courts have had in identifying the source of the right. See, e.g., Raoul Berger,
Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 855,
876-77 (1981) (Court, in employing sourceless rights, simply supplanting morality of the peo-
ple with its own). However, the sourceless right to travel has become an accepted doctrine.
See infra part II.C.
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less, regardless of source,42 the Court has long recognized the right to
travel as a fundamental right. 3
42. Prior to Shapiro, see infra part II.B, the right to travel was located in many sources,
for example: the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lo-
pez, 476 US. 898, 920 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Zobel v. Williams, 457 US. 55, 67
(1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418,430 (1870); Cran-
dall v. Nevada, 73 US. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867); The Passenger Cases, 48 US. (7 How.) 283,
492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 3230), the Commerce Clause, Edwards v. California, 314 US. 160, 173-74 (1941);
Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49 (Clifford, J., concurring), the Dormant Commerce Clause,
Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49 (Chase, C.J., and Clifford, J., concurring), the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Edwards, 314 US. at 177-79 (Douglas, J.,
concurring), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631; Kent
v. Dulles, 357 US. 116, 125 (1958), the penumbra of the First Amendment, Zemel v. Rusk,
381 US. 1, 24 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting), inferred from the structure of the federal union,
Zobel, 457 US. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring); Shapiro, 394 US. at 618; Guest, 383 US. at
757-58, or even in no particular constitutional source, Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630.
Prior to Edwards, which was decided in 1941, the right to travel had become a "token"
right of national citizenship, along with the right to use ports, have access to the federal courts,
and petition the government for grievances, which justices could point to in order to demon-
strate that some rights did exist under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment while they denied other rights the protection of that clause. See Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (finding right to travel is right of national citizenship, but privi-
lege against self-incrimination is not); Williams v. Fears, 179 US. 270, 274 (1900) (holding
"right of locomotion" is right of national citizenship, but tax on persons recruiting laborers for
out-of-state jobs burdened right only "incidentally and remotely").
Because the right to travel was simply one of the few "window-dressing" rights held pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there was no pressing judicial need to locate a source
for the right. See Stewart Baker, Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 UCLA
L. REv. 1129, 1131 n.14 (1975); Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward a ConstitutionalAnaly-
sis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 Nw. U. L. Rav. 820, 823 n.24 (1992).
However, 75 years after Crandall, the right to travel was taken from the showcase win-
dow, dusted off, and again used as a substantive right in Edwards, thus ushering in the "mod-
em" era of right to travel analysis-distinguished from the early right to travel era not only by
the passing of some 75 years, but also by the transportation of the source of the right to travel
from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV or the Commerce Clause into either
the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
43. Soto-Lopez, 476 US. at 901-02; Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6; Jones v. Helms, 452 US.
412, 418-19 & nn.12-13 (1981); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418-19 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 US. 250, 254 (1974); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 US. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro, 394 US. at 629-31, 634; Guest, 383 U.S. at 758;
Zemel, 381 US. at 23-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Kent, 357 US. at 126; Edwards, 314 US. at
177-78 (Douglas, J., concurring); Williams v. Fears, 179 US. 270, 274 (1900); Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); Crandall, 73 US. (6 Wall.) at 43-44; The Passenger Cases,
48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552; see also Baker,
supra note 42, at 1142 nn.71-72 (the right is well established; it has been recognized by judici-
ary for over 150 years).
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B. Shapiro v. Thompson and Durational Residence Requirements
In Shapiro v. Thompson,' the Court affirmed lower court rulings
that the one-year residence requirements for receipt of public assistance
funds of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia were
unconstitutional, violating the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.4"
Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority, grounded the right to
travel analysis in the Equal Protection Clause.46 Justice Brennan applied
strict scrutiny,47 reasoning that the waiting periods discriminated against
those who had recently exercised their right to travel.48
The Court's opinion gave no specific indication as to why the stat-
utes in question triggered strict scrutiny review, other than that the clas-
sification of needy persons on the basis of length of residence constituted
an "invidious discrimination." 49 The Court found that the asserted state
interests were either constitutionally impermissible, or not compelling,
44. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). This decision spawned a good deal of commentary; however,
most of it has been outdated by court decisions in the mid- to late seventies. Others are not
relevant to this Comment because they trace the right to travel as it relates to voting or other
matters. Some works, however, have for various reasons survived rather well. See Baker,
supra note 42; see also Note, Shapiro v. Thompson" Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 989 (1969); Robert B. Thompson, Comment, The Right to Travel-Its Protec-
tion and Application Under the Constitution, 40 UMKC L. REV. 66 (1972). Interestingly, one
commentatorprior to the final Shapiro decision actually anticipated some of the possible varia-
tions of durational residence requirements that states are using today. See Bernard E. Harvith,
The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54
CAL. L. REV. 567, 619-27 (1966).
45. Shapiro, 394 US. at 638, 641-42.
46. Id. at 633. However, the Court noted no need to "ascribe the source of this right to
travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision." Id. at 630.
47. Id. at 634. Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the statute in question meet a "com-
pelling state interest," id. at 634, 638, and that it be the least discriminatory means of achiev-
ing that interest, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at
1451-54 (2d ed. 1988).
48. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633. The Court stated that "a State may no more try to fence out
those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents gener-
ally." Id. at 631.
49. Id. at 627. An "invidious discrimination" can arise either by statutory employment of
a "suspect class" or by abridgement of a "fundamental right." See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 16-
6. In Shapiro, the Court was unclear as to whether it was indigency as a suspect class or the
right to travel as a fundamental right, or both, that established the "invidious discrimination"
and led to strict scrutiny.
Some early commentators felt-and certainly several of the justices in the Shapiro major-
ity would have agreed-that Shapiro established indigency as a suspect classification. See,
e.g., Patrick J. Kearney, Constitutional Law-Right to Travel, 8 DuQ. L. REv. 170, 179-80
(1969-70); Margaret K. Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thompson: "The Beggars Are Coming to
Town", 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 303, 331-32. However, the Court quickly rejected that interpreta-
tion in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US. 471, 484 (1970) (applying rational basis review to law
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and thus the statutes failed strict scrutiny.50 The states' primary justifi-
cation was that of inhibiting migration into the jurisdiction as a means of
preserving the fiscal integrity of the states' assistance programs.51 The
Court specifically held that deterring indigents from migrating to the
state was not a constitutionally permissible state objective.52 The Court
also found any attempt to apportion state funds based on length of resi-
dence to be constitutionally impermissible.1
3
After focusing on the intent to discourage travel by indigents, the
Court shifted its analysis to the statutes' effects, stating that: "[A]ny
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of the [right to travel],
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental in-
terest, is unconstitutional." 4 While this formulation seems to invalidate
almost all durational residence requirements, the Court included lan-
guage in a problematic footnote, which appears to impose a limit on its
rationale:
limiting welfare payments to large indigent families). See infra part II.C for the modifications
and clarifications to the Shapiro decision.
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Shapiro was devoted to the right to travel; however, his
opinion did not settle when that right invoked strict scrutiny. He referred to a "virtually
unconditional personal" right to travel, and stated that strict scrutiny was triggered by any law
that "clearly impinges" on that right. Shapiro, 394 US. at 643-44 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Interestingly, the Court would later rely on this vague language to expand strict scrutiny re-
view. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); infra part IV.C.3.
50. Shapiro, 394 US. at 627-38.
51. Id. at 627-33. The Court did "recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving
the fiscal integrity of its programs .... But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by
invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens." Id. at 633.
52. Id. at 631. The Court noted that "if a law has 'no other purpose... than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is]
patently unconstitutional.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
Interestingly, the Connecticut residence requirement, which was held unconstitutional,
barred assistance only to those who were eligible for welfare at the time they came into the
State. Id. at 622 (referring to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965)). It did not operate
against persons who, though subsequently needy, entered the state with a bona fide job, or who
were at the time self-supporting. Id. That these provisions fell along with the strict one-year
residence requirements of Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia suggests that state rules
penalizing those who enter the state for the purpose of benefitting from the higher welfare
standards are likewise unconstitutional inasmuch as they place an equal burden on the right to
travel. See Christopher N. May, Supreme Court Holds Residency Test Unconstitutional,
CLEARINGHOUSE REv., May 1969, at 1.
53. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632-33. The Court reasoned that this would "logically permit the
State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire
protection .... The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state serv-
ices." Id. This reasoning has bothered some Justices, who have found no reason why appor-
tionment of services based on past contribution should in all cases offend equal protection.
See, eg., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 82-84 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
54. Shapiro, 394 US. at 634.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tui-
tion-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession,
to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote
compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other,
may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional
right of interstate travel.5 5
Thus, the Court in Shapiro set up a type of penalty analysis to examine
restrictions on the right to travel, seemingly requiring a finding of both a
penalty and a deterrence to interstate travel. 6
Shapiro has proven to be a milestone in right to travel analysis for
several reasons. It was the first case to declare the Equal Protection
Clause the proper framework of the right to travel analysis, 57 the first
case to apply strict scrutiny to protect that right,58 and the first case to
declare that neither state nor federal governments could abridge the right
to travel-even indirectly. 9 By striking down an indirect burden on the
right to travel, the right was given new importance and a potentially
broader scope, because welfare was not the only governmental benefit
subject to waiting periods.6
However, Shapiro left the precise contours of the right undefined.6
Though the case set up the two-pronged test of penalty and deterrence,
the test itself was vague. There seemed to be a possibility for overly
broad application of strict scrutiny, which troubled some scholars and
members of the Court 2.6  Further, though the right was placed within the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the Shapiro decision
55. Id. at 638 n.21. However, the vagueness of the Shapiro decision, and this footnote in
particular, have caused quite a controversy in its subsequent interpretation. See infra notes
225-27 and accompanying text.
The Court later dealt with residency requirements for some of the other purposes men-
tioned above. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (invalidating "fixed
point" residency requirement for civil service preferences); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1974)
(holding constitutional one-year waiting period to receive divorce); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
US. 330 (1972) (invalidating state residency requirements for voting).
56. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631. However, this did not last long: The apparent requirement
of actual deterrence was quickly eliminated. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
57. Shapiro, 394 US. at 633.
58. Id at 634.
59. Id at 644. In invalidating the District of Columbia statute, the Court used the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, which is applicable to congressional action. Compare id.
with Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (holding that federal government cannot abridge
right to travel abroad).
60. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. Baker, supra note 42, at 1137.
62. Shapiro, 394 US. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Rosenheim, supra note 49, at
331-34 (finding great potential for redistribution of resources by judicial indirection).
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hardly stated that the Equal Protection Clause was the sole and definitive
source of the right.63 Most problematic, however, was the Court's failure
to advance a clear test to delineate the circumstances under which ra-
tional basis review or strict scrutiny review is appropriate. It was not
long, however, before the Court began to address these inadequacies in
an attempt to sharpen the boundaries of the Shapiro analysis.
C. The Right to Travel After Shapiro v. Thompson
1. Dandridge v. Williams
In the several years following Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court clari-
fied and extended the right to travel analysis introduced in Shapiro. In
Dandridge v. Williams 6" the Court put to rest any speculation that indi-
gency itself was a suspect class or that all denial of welfare benefits im-
pinge a fundamental right,6" holding that disparity in state aid programs
was subject to the rational basis test.66
2. Dunn v. Blumstein
Dunn v. Blumstein,67 decided in 1972, was the first case following
Shapiro in which the Court attempted to clear up some of the confusion
caused by the penalty analysis. In Dunn, the Court expressly stated what
it had only implied in Shapiro: It is unnecessary to actually deter travel
to trigger strict scrutiny.6" Dunn involved the denial of the right to vote
63. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
65. Id. at 484 & n.16. The Court distinguished Shapiro by stating that the Court in Sha-
piro found "state interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel."
Id. at 484 n.16. In Dandridge, the Court noted that "here we deal with state regulation in the
social and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment only because the regulation results in some disparity in
grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC families." Id. at 484.
66. Id. at 485.
67. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
68. The Court held that:
Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel.
Nor have any other "right to travel" cases in this Court always relied on the presence
of actual deterrence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling-state-inter-
est test would be triggered by "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right [to travel]."
Id. at 339-40.
Interestingly, it is the language of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Shapiro that the Dunn
Court relied on in order to buttress its assertion that penalty analysis is the proper approach
for right to travel cases. Justice Stewart described the right to travel as an "unconditional
personal right" the exercise of which may not be conditioned. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643 (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
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to new residents.69 In defense of its durational residence requirement,
Tennessee attempted to distinguish Shapiro by urging that "the vice of
the welfare statute in Shapiro ...was its objective to deter interstate
travel,"70 and that the Tennessee statute neither deterred nor attempted
to deter interstate travel.71 However, the Court stated that this is "a
fundamental misunderstanding of the law."'7 2 Thus, the Court indirectly
in Dunn held that legislative intent, even where innocent of any intent to
deter migration, is irrelevant. 73 It is the penalty-actual or potential-
on those who have exercised their rights that triggers strict scrutiny.
74
3. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County
The Court's decision in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,7
decided in 1974, further clarified the Shapiro test. In Memorial Hospital,
the Court invalidated an Arizona statute requiring one-year residence in-
county as a condition to receiving nonemergency medical care at the
county's expense.76 The Court began by making an important distinc-
tion-one that had troubled the courts for some time. The Court stated
that "[tihe right to travel was involved in only a limited sense in Shapiro.
The Court was there concerned with the right to migrate, 'with intent to
settle and abide' or, as the Court put it, 'to resettle, find a new job and
start a new life.' ",77 This distinction is crucial. It is not simply the right
to travel state to state that is protected, but the right to migrate-to
69. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331.
70. Id. at 339.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 339 & n.8.
73. See id. at 339-42.
74. Id. at 340. Also, the Court stated that "[t]ravel is permitted, but only at a price:
voting is prohibited. The right to travel is merely penalized, while the right to vote is abso-
lutely denied. But these differences are irrelevant for present purposes." Id. at 341. The
Court stated that the penalty need not be total denial of the right in order to trigger strict
scrutiny. See id. at 340-41.
However, Dunn differs from Shapiro in a significant way. In Shapiro, the individual was
forced to choose between the right to travel, a fundamental right, and the welfare entitlement,
which Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), found not fundamental. In Dunn, the
Court considered the state-imposed choice between two fundamental rights, the right to travel
and the right to vote: "In the present case, such laws force a person who wishes to travel and
change residence to choose between travel and the basic right to vote.... Absent a compelling
state interest, a State may not burden the right to travel in this way." Dunn, 405 U.S. at 342.
75. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
76. See id. at 269-70. In keeping with the traditional nexus between indigency and the
right to travel, this case was brought by an indigent new resident who was afflicted with
chronic asthma and bronchial illness and who suffered a severe respiratory attack within a
month after moving into the state. Id. at 251. For more on the nexus between indigence and
the right to travel, see infra part III.B.
77. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 255 (quoting Shapiro, 394 US. at 629).
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change one's domicile. As the Court noted, "even a bona fide residence
requirement would burden the right to travel if travel meant merely
movement.
781
More importantly, the Court in Memorial Hospital continued both
the penalty analysis and the "necessities of life" argument begun in Sha-
piro. The Court noted that "[i]n Shapiro, the Court found denial of the
basic 'necessities of life' to be a penalty, '79 and then held that
"[w]hatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is
at least clear that medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an
indigent as welfare assistance."8 0 Thus, in Memorial Hospital the Court
answered an important question left vague in Shapiro: Though there is
no fundamental right to the "basic necessities of life," as some feared
might be the implication of Shapiro,"1 the denial of those important bene-
fits very likely "serves to penalize" the right to travel, thus triggering
strict scrutiny. 2 Memorial Hospital, therefore, marks the beginning of
the Court's focus on the "severity of the deprivation" as the proper mea-
suring stick in determining whether the right to travel has been
penalized.
However, though Memorial Hospital made significant strides in
clarifying the Shapiro doctrine, it also reintroduced one of the old
problems. In reaching its decision, the Court quoted the biblical com-
mandment that: "Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stran-
ger as for one of your own country. '8 3 Though this language is most
probably a rhetorical flourish by Justice Thurgood Marshall, it planted a
problematic seed.84 The quoted biblical language fails to make an impor-
tant distinction: Durational residence requirements are not laws between
residents and nonresidents, which the biblical language addresses, but are
instead laws distinguishing between two groups of bona fide residents.
This distinction is the core of the rationale for applying equal protection
review in right to travel cases.8 5
78. Id.
79. Id. at 259 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627).
80. Id.
81. See supra note 49. This was settled as to welfare aid by Dandridge. See supra part
II.C.l.
82. See Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 258-60.
83. Id. at 261 (quoting Leviticus 24:22).
84. This seed comes to fruition in the opinions of Justice O'Connor in several later cases.
See Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 US. 898, 920 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 US. 55, 73-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra notes 127-30, 147-
48 and accompanying text for the problems with this position.
85. Creating groups between similarly situated individuals is the type of action prohibited
by the Equal Protection Clause. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 16-1, at 1438; Zobel, 457 U.S. at
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Also, this case marked the first opinion by Justice William Rehn-
quist in the right to travel cases.86 Justice Rehnquist properly took the
Court to task for not specifying "how to distinguish a waiting period
which is a penalty from one which is not."'8 7 However, Justice Rehnquist
failed to note the majority's crucial distinction between migration and
travel. 8 Instead, he focused on travel.8 9 He noted that penalties im-
posed by toll bridges on individuals entering the state could theoretically
be deemed a penalty on travel.9" While this is true, such an example
ignores the equal protection framework within which the right to travel
analysis arises:9 1 Such a toll would theoretically apply to all persons en-
tering the state, not single out a special group to pay the toll, and thus
would not raise the same equal protection concerns. 92 The Court has
indicated that it has not focused specifically on travel in the recent right
to travel cases, but on the ability to change one's domicile. 93
Next, Justice Rehnquist wanted the Court to examine "whether the
challenged requirement erects a real and purposeful barrier to move-
ment, or the threat of such a barrier, or whether the effects on travel,
viewed realistically, are merely incidental and remote."9 After noting
the "recent vintage" of the Shapiro line of cases, 95 Justice Rehnquist
stated that, as the "barrier here is hardly a counterpart to the barriers
60. Obscuring that fact could improperly change the constitutional framework of the right to
travel analysis. Such language instead smacks of Privileges and Immunities review, which is
problematic. See infra notes 127-30, 147-48 and accompanying text.
86. MemorialHosp., 415 US. at 277-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Though Justice Rehn-
quist was on the Court at the time Dunn was decided, he took no part in the decision. 405 US.
at 360.
87. Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 284 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
89. See Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 284 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. See Baker, supra note 42, at 1153 n.134.
92. It is true, however, that the right to travel has its own jurisprudence outside the equal
protection/fundamental right analysis. Thus, Justice Rehnquist is correct in stating that an
extreme toll, which prevented people from migrating into a state, could in fact be a burden on
the right to travel even without drawing group lines and raising equal protection concerns. See
Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 284 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
94. Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 285 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). To some extent, such a
requirement harkens back to Edwards v. California, 314 US. 160 (1941); see supra notes 187-
88 and accompanying text.
95. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 283 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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condemned in earlier cases,",96 the Court should defer to "the State's al-
location of its limited financial resources.
'97
Finally, Justice Rehnquist took issue with the Court's dismissal of
protection of the public purse as an insufficient state objective.9 8 Typify-
ing his tendency toward legislative deference, he stated that "this sort of
judgment has traditionally been confided to legislatures, rather than to
courts charged with determining constitutional questions." 99 However,
viewing residence requirements as types of economic legislation that de-
serve judicial deference undermines the role of equal protection analy-
sis-the framework in which the right to travel analysis occurs.l" °
4. Sosna v. Iowa
The next case in which the Court defined the parameters of the right
to travel doctrine as put forth in Shapiro was Sosna v. Iowa.1"' Decided
in 1975, Sosna addressed the constitutionality of an Iowa statute requir-
ing individuals to be residents of the state for one year prior to filing a
petition for a divorce action." 2 The Court upheld the statute as constitu-
tional." 3 In a decision written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court distin-
guished Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital by noting that those
96. Id. at 285-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The "earlier cases" referred to are Crandall
v. Nevada, 73 US. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900), and Edwards,
314 U.S. 160. See Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 288 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However,
these cases are problematic precedent because they do not use the equal protection framework,
which the Court adopted in Shapiro and has applied since that decision. See supra parts
II.B-C. Justice Rehnquist's dissent indicates his unhappiness with the equal protection frame-
work for review.
97. Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 286 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist is es-
sentially calling for rational basis review.
98. Id. at 287 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's comment is understandable,
though misplaced. What Justice Rehnquist objected to was the unnecessary language em-
ployed by the majority, indicating that Arizona would actually save money by providing the
nonemergency care to new residents because, if indigent, the State would bear the burden of
treating the illness once it degenerates to emergency status due to nontreatment. See id. at
250. This conclusion that the state is actually not even saving money is, of course, unnecessary
to the holding that "[t]he conservation of the taxpayers' purse is simply not a sufficient state
interest to sustain a durational residence requirement which, in effect, severely penalizes exer-
cise of the right to freely migrate and settle in another State." Id. at 263.
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Further, the simple fact that a state is
spending money does not prevent strict judicial review when a fundamental right is at issue.
101. 419 US. 393 (1975).
102. Id. at 395. The statute provided: "the petition for dissolution of marriage.., must
state that the petitioner has been for the last year a resident of the state,... and that the
maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a
marriage dissolution only." Id. at 395 n.1 (referring to IOWA CODE § 598.6 (1973)).
103. Id. at 396.
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cases involved state justifications based on "budgetary or record-keeping
considerations which were held insufficient to outweigh the constitu-
tional claims of the individuals."'" Here, said the Court, "the dura-
tional residency requirement under attack . . . is a part of Iowa's
comprehensive statutory regulation of domestic relations, an area that
has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States."'1
0 5
Having thus distinguished Shapiro, the Court added a crucial test to
the right to travel analysis, focusing on whether or not the plaintiff in
Sosna had been "irretrievably foreclosed" from obtaining the relief she
sought.'0 6 Thus, without expressly saying so, the Court added a new
element to the penalty analysis begun in Shapiro and extended through
Dunn and Memorial Hospital.0 7 Now, apparently, a state statute re-
stricting the right to travel does not constitute a penalty unless the stat-
ute irretrievably forecloses an individual from the exercise of rights or
the receipt of benefits.' 08 In Sosna the Court held that the plaintiff could
"ultimately have obtained the same opportunity for adjudication which
she asserts ought to have been hers at an earlier point in time."'0 9
However, the Court seems to have done more than simply deter-
mine whether the plaintiff had been irretrievably foreclosed from ob-
taining a benefit. Instead, the Court took an approach similar to
104. Ia at 406.
105. Id. at 404. The Court relied on several cases that attributed to the state the "absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation.., shall be created, and the
causes for which it may be dissolved." Id. (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35
(1878)).
106. Id. at 406.
107. See supra notes 54-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the origin and exten-
sion of right to travel penalty analysis.
108. The Court distinguished the welfare recipients in Shapiro, the voters in Dunn, and the
indigent patient in Memorial Hospital. Sosna, 419 US. at 406. At first glance this distinction
seems to be weak. While the Shapiro and Memorial Hospital plaintiffs were completely denied
benefits for a period of time and could never thereafter recoup those benefits, such is not true of
the voters in Dunn. In Dunn, after one year, new residents would be able to vote like older
residents. The three cases, however, can be reconciled: Dunn's deprivation of the right to vote
makes sense if voting is defined as the specific opportunity to vote at a specific election. Thus,
if a new resident cannot vote for a county official because an election occurs six months after
his or her arrival in the state, that resident has been irretrievably foreclosed from voting in that
specific election. Consequently, the "irretrievably foreclosed" standard is properly applied to
voting statutes.
Unfortunately, if voting can be cast in that light, so, too, can divorce. Under the Sosna
facts, the plaintiff is irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining a speedy divorce during her initial
year of residence. Like the deprived voter, she has missed an opportunity-to obtain a divorce
when she wanted one. Arguably, an immediate divorce is not equivalent to a divorce a year
from now. Id. at 422 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing costs involved in having to wait one
year to file divorce petition). Thus, the "irretrievably foreclosed" language is misleading.
109. Id. at 406.
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Memorial Hospital, focusing on the severity of the deprivation,"1 ' and
whether the benefit or opportunity denied was fungible. By considering
these additional factors, the Court determined how willing it was to ac-
cept the delay caused by the waiting period. In Sosna the Court seemed
to imply that speedy divorce grants, unlike welfare payments, medical
care, or voting, are rather fungible and unimportant.1 11 To the Court the
difference between obtaining a divorce in one month or one year made
little substantive difference.I12 In Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospi-
tal, the deprivations were all serious-either basic necessities of life or
the fundamental right to vote. 13 Moreover, the benefits were not fungi-
ble-the recipient is not made whole by receiving welfare, medical care,
or the right to vote one year after the benefit was needed. 14 Thus, mea-
suring the seriousness of the deprivation seems to be a more proper un-
derstanding of the "irretrievably foreclosed" notion and of the distinction
between Sosna and the three earlier cases.
The greatest difficulty of Sosna, however, is determining the Court's
reasoning in deciding whether the statute was constitutional. Was a
strict scrutiny review not triggered because the statute failed to constitute
a penalty since the plaintiff was not irretrievably foreclosed? Or was ra-
tional basis review utilized from the outset? Because the Court first de-
termined the issue of regulation of marriage to be traditionally the
province of the states, rather than decide whether the right to travel had
been penalized, this opinion smacks of rational basis review. 5 Justice
Marshall best summed up this problem, stating in his dissent that instead
of following equal protection analysis, "the Court has employed what
appears to be an ad hoc balancing test, under which the State's putative
interest in ensuring that its divorce petitioners establish some roots in
Iowa is said to justify the one-year residency requirement.""' 6 This deci-
sion made even more precarious the already confusing realm of the right
to travel.
110. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
111. Sosna, 419 US. at 406-07.
112. Id. at 421 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. See supra notes 44-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
114. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406.
115. See id. at 404. Rather than asking if the right has been penalized, the Court appar-
ently tried to find any excuse to apply rational basis review. Nevertheless, by including the
"irretrievably foreclosed" notion in the penalty analysis, the result is the same-the statute is
held not to be a penalty and rational basis review is applied.
116. Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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5. Zobel v. Williams
The next case to address the right to travel took a new procedural
twist117 and did little to place right to travel analysis back on firm foot-
ing. In Zobel v. Williams," 8 decided in 1982, the Court struck down an
Alaska statute that divided income derived from the state's natural re-
sources among citizens based on length of residence. 1 9 Though the stat-
ute did not deal with durational residence requirements, but instead
involved a "fixed-point" residence requirement, 120 the case is still rele-
vant to the consideration of durational residence requirements for several
reasons.
First, Zobel introduced a new order for analyzing right to travel
cases. Rather than first determining which standard of review was rele-
vant and then applying that standard, the Court stated that "[iln any
event, if the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimal test proposed
by the State, we need not decide whether any enhanced scrutiny is called
for." 1' After noting that two of the proposed state purposes for the law
were not rationally related to the distinctions between new and old resi-
dents,122 the Court regarded Alaska's proposed justification of the statute
117. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
118. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). This case is also famous for its application of "rational basis with
teeth," or "second order" rational basis review. See TRIBE, supra note 47, §§ 16-2 to 16-3, at
1443-44. Professor Tribe observed that the second order rational basis test applied in Zobel
seemed
more the result of dissatisfaction with the existing tools of equal protection analysis
for dealing with "fixed permanent distinctions between ... classes of concededly
bona fide residents, based on how long they have been in the State," than of any
overall shift in the Court's scrutiny of how well various purposes fit legislatively cho-
sen means.
Id. § 16-2, at 1441-42 (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59).
119. Zobel, 457 US. at 65. All Alaska residents received dividends from the permanent
fund, though older residents received larger shares. Thus, unlike Shapiro and its progeny, no
residents were being denied benefits. All residents received something that they would not
otherwise have received. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, seized upon this fact and found the
right to travel cases inapplicable. Id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The statute, however,
still distinguished residents based on how recently they moved to the state in order to deter-
mine the size of the dividends. Id. at 57.
120. A fixed-point residence requirement, as opposed to a durational residence requirement,
"creates fixed, permanent distinctions between an ever-increasing number of perpetual classes
of concededly bona fide residents, based on how long they have been in the State." Id. at 59.
121. Id. at 60-61. This approach, criticized by the dissenters, was later abandoned. See
infra note 140 and accompanying text.
122. The offered justifications were: (1) providing an incentive to establish and maintain
residence in Alaska; (2) encouraging prudent management of the fund that distributed the
dividends from the natural resources; and (3) rewarding past contributions. Zobel, 457 U.S. at
61, 63. As discussed above, this is hardly the ordinary rational basis test. See TRIBE, supra
note 47, §§ 16-2 to 16-3, at 1439-46.
November 1993] DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS 323
as rewarding its citizens for past contributions. 123 Reiterating Shapiro,
the Court held that this was "not a legitimate state purpose"12 4 and
struck down the statute as unconstitutional without proceeding to strict
scrutiny.'2 5 By taking such a course, the Court shifted the focus of the
right to travel analysis away from determining if the right had been pe-
nalized. The Court, thus, further confused the issue of when strict scru-
tiny should be applied.' 26
Second, Zobel gives some insight into the views of several members
of the current Court concerning the right to travel. Justice O'Connor, in
her concurrence, indicated her desire to place the right to travel analysis
within the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.127 Though
Justice O'Connor noted that the Alaska statute discriminated among res-
idents, not among residents and nonresidents,12 she argued that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause "addresses just this type of discrimina-
tion, '  and would have invalidated the Alaska statute under that
clause.' 3 Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, regarded the statute as a
123. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63-64.
124. Id at 63. However, Justice O'Connor in her concurrence noted the recurrence of a
problem that arose in Shapiro: Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment makes rewarding citi-
zens for past contributions an illegitimate state interest. Id. at 73-75 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); see supra note 51; infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
125. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65.
126. The Zobel Court made no mention of the penalty analysis that previously had been the
core of the right to travel cases. However, in defense of the Court, this new "rational basis
first" approach may simply have been an exercise in judicial economy. Faced with a statute
having three proffered justifications, where two are irrational and one is impermissible, there
arguably was no need to do a penalty analysis.
127. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 73-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[T]his analysis supplies a
needed foundation for many of the 'right to travel' claims discussed in the Court's prior opin-
ions." Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Though it is at least arguable that the policy underlying the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is in fact aimed at this type of discrimination, a Privileges and Immunities Clause right
to travel analysis is problematic for several reasons. As Justice O'Connor herself points out,
the discrimination is occurring among classes of residents, not among residents and nonresi-
dents. Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Thus, it is very possible that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, by its own language, does not even apply. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487
N.W.2d 896, 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (durational residence requirement did not present
Privileges and Immunities Clause claim). Professor Tribe, however, suggests that this clause is
in fact a viable solution. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 7-4, at 558-59, § 16-8, at 1455 n.3.
Nevertheless, even if the clause does apply, Equal Protection Clause analysis applies as well
and is in fact more specifically tailored for problems involving groupings of similarly situated
residents. See id. at § 16-1.
128. Zobel, 457 US. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The fact that this discrimination unfolds after
the nonresident establishes residency does not insulate Alaska's scheme from scrutiny under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause." Id at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring), Interestingly, in applying the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause, Justice O'Connor noted that "[c]ertainly the right infringed in this case is
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"distribution scheme being in the nature of economic regulation." '131 Be-
cause "state economic regulations are presumptively valid," 13 2 Justice
Rehnquist found the majority's invalidation of the statute under equal
protection irrational.' 33 Also, like Justice O'Connor, Justice Rehnquist
found fault with the majority's dismissal of the state's justification of rec-
ognizing past contributions as illegitimate. 13  Noting that the Alaska
statute encouraged rather than penalized travel, Justice Rehnquist found
the right to travel cases inapplicable.
135
6. Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez
In Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez,136 the last significant case prior to
the current resurgence of durational residence requirements in which the
Court discussed the right to travel, Justice Brennan's methodical major-
ity opinion placed the right to travel analysis on firmer footing. In Soto-
Lopez, the Court addressed a New York statute that gave a civil service
preference to current resident veterans who were also residents of New
York at the time they entered military service.137 In scrutinizing the
constitutionality of the statute, the Court presented the most recent and
clear annunciation of the current right to travel analysis.
The Court first noted the historic existence of the fundamental right
to travel, using the more precise "right of free interstate migration" la-
bel. 3 Then, the Court observed that "[a] state law implicates the right
'fundamental.' Alaska's statute burdens those nonresidents who choose to settle in the State.
It is difficult to imagine a right more essential to the Nation as a whole than the right to
establish residence in a new State." Id. at 76-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 82-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This is similar to his dissent in Memorial
Hospital. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
134. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 82-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). Some commentators have also questioned the Court's condemnation of rewarding
older residents. See, e-g., Katheryn D. Katz, More Equal Than Others: The Burger Court and
the Newly Arrived State Resident, 19 N.M. L. REv. 329 (1989).
135. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Though it is true that all residents
receive a benefit they would not receive otherwise, equal protection analysis does not end there.
The fact that a benefit is offered to new residents does not shield the statute distributing the
benefits if that statute makes impermissible classifications based on how recently a person exer-
cised his or her constitutional right to migrate. By offering some benefits to new residents, the
state may not "buy up" the constitutional rights of new residents. Nor may it buy its way out
of the equal protection analysis.
136. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
137. Id. at 899.
138. Id. at 902. The Court also reiterated the lack of constitutional source for the right to
travel by acknowledging that "we have not felt impelled to locate this right definitively in any
particular constitutional provision . . . . Whatever its origin, the right to migrate is firmly
established and has been repeatedly recognized by our cases." Id. at 902-03. As in Shapiro,
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to travel when it actually deters such travel... when impeding travel is
its primary objective.., or when it uses 'any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of that right.' "139
Thus, the Court refocused the right to travel on penalty analysis. In
doing so, the majority synthesized the elements of Shapiro and its prog-
eny into a clear test. The Court must first determine "whether [the stat-
ute] operates to penalize those persons who have exercised their right to
migrate. If we find that it does, [the statute must fail] unless [the state]
can demonstrate that its classification is necessary to accomplish a com-
pelling state interest."" 4  The Court noted that "even temporary depri-
vations of very important benefits and rights can operate to penalize
migration."
'14 1
The Court then analyzed the New York statute under this test.
Though finding the interest in Soto-Lopez to be less substantial than
those in either Shapiro or Dunn, the Court nonetheless found the interest
substantial enough to trigger strict scrutiny.142 The Court held that
"[s]uch a permanent deprivation of a significant benefit, based only on
the fact of nonresidence at a past point in time, clearly operates to penal-
ize [them] for exercising their rights to migrate." '43 After finding a pen-
alty on the right to migrate, the Court applied strict scrutiny review. The
Court held that all four of the state's asserted interests"4 failed to with-
stand heightened scrutiny for lack of narrow tailoring. 45 The Court
the lack of an express constitutional source for the right to travel does not hamper its applica-
tion. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text discussing the "sourceless right to travel."
139. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634).
140. Id. at 906. Thus, the Court effectively abandoned the "rational basis first" style of
review which the Court used in Zobel. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text discuss-
ing this unique procedural approach adopted in Zobel. Chief Justice Burger, in his concur-
rence in Soto-Lopez, maintained that this Zobel method of analysis is proper, because if the
statute is invalid under rational basis review, then any holding based on the right to travel and
strict scrutiny is unnecessary. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 913 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
141. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 907.
142. The Court noted that "[w]hile the benefit sought here may not rise to the same level of
importance as the necessities of life and the right to vote, it is unquestionably substantial." Id
at 908. The Court also noted the effect of the veteran's credits on obtaining employment, job
security, good pay, and benefits, as well as the fact that the individuals had "been permanently
deprived of the veteran's credits that they [sought]." Id. at 909. Note the incorporation of the
Sosna "irretrievably foreclosed" element into the penalty analysis. See supra part H.C.4.
143. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 909.
144. The asserted state justifications were: "(1) the encouragement of New York residents
to join the Armed Services; (2) the compensation of residents for service in time of war... ; (3)
the inducement of veterans to return to New York... ; and (4) the employment of a 'uniquely
valuable class of public servants.'" Id.
145. Id.
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held that "each of the State's asserted interests could be promoted fully
by granting bonus points to all otherwise qualified veterans." '146
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Justices Rehn-
quist and Stevens, is problematic. Though by now an accepted piece of
constitutional analysis, Justice O'Connor reiterated her disdain for the
"sourceless" right to travel.147 She repeated her belief that the right to
travel is more properly placed within the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV.148 Also, she continued to advocate the position
that compensating citizens for prior contributions is neither inherently
invidious nor irrational. 49 Justice O'Connor also disagreed that the
right to travel had been burdened, noting that the benefit was not very
significant, in that it only increased the chance of employment but did
not guarantee it,'5 0 and thus she found heightened scrutiny inappropri-
ate. 5 ' Justice O'Connor would require that "something more than the
minimal effect on the right to travel or migrate that exists in this case
must be required to trigger heightened scrutiny."' 52
Thus, following Soto-Lopez, the question still exists: How much of
an effect must a state law have on the right to travel in order to constitute
a penalty and trigger strict scrutiny? Though the Court in Soto-Lopez
delineated the analysis to be used in right to travel cases,"5 3 it did not
fully answer that question. However, the majority in Soto-Lopez does
seem to have favored finding a penalty. Though a penalty on the right to
travel was found in that case, it is certainly nowhere near as severe as the
deprivations in Shapiro, Dunn, or Memorial Hospital. Unfortunately,
rather than admit the low significance of the deprivation and hold that
even deprivations of this low magnitude penalize the right to travel, the
majority asserted that the interest was substantial, and thus found the
deprivation to be a penalty.'54 However, though the Soto-Lopez majority
found a penalty, at least three members of the current Court would not
146. Id.
147. Id. at 920 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor previously admitted that the
right to travel is both a fundamental right and possibly the right most "essential to the Nation
as a whole." Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
148. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 920 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 127-30 discuss-
ing Justice O'Connor's view and its problems.
149. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 920 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 72
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
150. Id. at 922 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 924 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 925 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
154. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 908.
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have found the deprivation in Soto-Lopez to be substantial and thus not a
penalty on the right to travel."'5 Furthermore, of the majority, five are
no longer on the Court.'56 But, knowing that some current Justices
would not have found a penalty in Soto-Lopez still does not answer the
threshold question of when strict scrutiny is required. It is into this mo-
rass that state legislators have recently waded, tempting the Court to
finally draw a line that allows them to discriminate against indigent new
residents.
III. MOTIVES UNDERLYING THE ENACTMENT OF DURATIONAL
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
Though part II presents the legal framework into which the new
durational residence requirements for welfare aid enter, these statutes
cannot be properly analyzed within that framework without an under-
standing of the motivations and assumptions that underlie any considera-
tion of welfare reform. This part provides that background by
considering the viability of the welfare magnet theory, the historical dis-
crimination against indigent individuals, and the public dissatisfaction
with the welfare system in general.
A. The Welfare Magnet Theory
The most prominent-and also one of the most constitutionally im-
permissible-reason for adopting durational residency requirements for
receipt of public assistance is the notion that the poor move to states that
pay the highest benefit levels.157 California and many other "high-bene-
fit" states158 have clearly stated that their residence requirements have
been enacted for the very purpose of discouraging interstate migration by
indigent individuals."5 9
155. Id. at 925 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156. Of the Soto-Lopez Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Powell, White,
and Brennan have retired.
157. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), made it very clear that a state may not
selectively admit some as residents and not others: "A State may no more try to fence out
those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents gener-
ally." Id. at 631.
158. See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with
this ranking.
159. Governor Pete Wilson of California has in fact openly stated that he feels the Shapiro
line of cases is wrong:
"[W]e will have to minimize the magnetic effect of the generosity of this state .... I
happen to think [the Shapiro line of cases is] wrong .... It seems to me that at the
very least there should be a period in which new residents do not receive the benefits
that the state provides. ... Otherwise .... you are risking the health of your eco-
nomic base."
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On its face it seems reasonable that the poor might gravitate to
states in which they would receive increased benefits. And apparently,
legislators are making decisions based on this generalized understanding
without further study. For example, when asked what percentage of wel-
fare recipients are new residents, the administration in California admit-
ted that, while statistics were unavailable, "it stands to reason that the
poor move here to take advantage of higher benefits."" Thus, because
of a lack of hard information, the welfare magnet theory has perpetuated
unfounded assumptions. Social science researchers, however, have bro-
ken this trend, compiling reports about the movement of indigents and
the composition of states' welfare rolls. This research indicates that the
welfare magnet theory-even if true-is exaggerated. 61
Were the welfare magnet effect real, one would expect a gradual
shifting of the poor from low-benefit to high-benefit states. This has not
occurred.162 Evidence from census data indicates that the movement of
Weintraub, supra note 15, at A3, A45; see Julie Kosterlitz, Behavior Modification, 24 NAT'L J.
271 (1992); see also Thomas Corbett, The Wisconsin Welfare Magnet Debate: What is an
Ordinary Member of the Tribe to Do When the Witch Doctors Disagree?, Focus (U. Wis.,
Madison), Fall & Winter 1991, at 19, 23 (proposal to Wisconsin legislature for imposing resi-
dence requirement based on perceived magnet effect of AFDC benefits); Bob Secter, Welfare
Trims Proposed to Cut Migration to Wisconsin, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1989, at Al (legislator
states: "We simply want to take away the incentive to come to Wisconsin.").
160. Weintraub, supra note 15, at A45.
161. See JOHN B. LANSING & EVA MUELLER, THE GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY OF LABOR
345 (1967) (welfare aid may provide some moderate incentive to move, but not shown conclu-
sively); Gordon F. De Jong & William L. Donnelly, Public Welfare and Migration, 54 Soc.
ScI. Q. 329, 342-44 (1973) (perceived greater availability of program assistance did not corre-
late in consistent pattern with migration behavior); Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the US.
Welfare System: A Review, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 56 (1992) (evidence of effects on
interstate migration is suggestive but inconclusive); Alan M. Schlottmann & Henry W.
Herzog, Jr., Employment Status and the Decision to Migrate, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 590, 597
(1981) (provision of welfare services had little or no impact on migration decision). But see
Corbett, supra note 159, at 20 (research results have been mixed); Lawrence Southwick, Jr.,
Public Welfare Programs and Recipient Migration, GROWTH & CHANGE, Oct. 1981, at 22, 29-
30 (welfare payment incentives do induce migration by welfare recipients, but migration oc-
curs for many reasons other than welfare). Note, however, that some of these studies were
based on data gathered from a time when durational residence requirements were in place.
Thus, these studies may not accurately measure the unrestrained magnet effect of state aid,
since some indigents may have been discouraged from moving because they would have been
subject to durational residence requirements.
162. Any migration that does occur is in very small numbers. From 1974 to 1981, only
approximately seven percent of AFDC recipients in the low-benefit states moved out of state,
and approximately three percent of AFDC recipients in high-benefit states moved out of state.
Edward M. Gramlich & Deborah S. Laren, Migration and Income Redistribution Responsibili-
ties, 19 J. HUM. RESOURCES 489, 505-06 (1984).
Seemingly, even at this sluggish rate, the poor would gravitate to the higher-benefit states.
However, scholarship indicates that it is the correlation with the general state economy, the
availability of jobs and training programs, and educational facilities provided by the state-not
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families below the poverty level generally follows the same pattern of
movement as the population as a whole. 16 3 In fact recent California
studies do not support the welfare magnet theory.164 Most current ana-
lysts agree that, though benefit levels play a part in an indigent's decision
to change his or her domicile, it is not the controlling factor. 165 Instead,
availability of jobs, average earnings, and unemployment seem to be the
critical factors. 166 Like the rest of the population, indigents move for
many reasons, not simply for welfare benefits.
Another problem with the welfare magnet theory is the perception
that a state is providing high-benefit levels. Obviously, no legislature
could believe the welfare magnet theory would be drawing indigents to
its state if it was not a high-benefit state. Logically, those states that
worry about the welfare magnet effect must consider themselves to be
high-benefit states as opposed to their sister states.
A state's perception of itself as high-benefit is often misleading.
Benefit levels are normally measured by the dollar amount of grants to
benefit levels-that explains the migration of indigent individuals. See LANSING & MUELLER,
supra note 161, at 336-40 (economic opportunities guided migration); De Jong & Donnelly,
supra note 161, at 342 (potential economic advancement is more important factor);
Schlottmann & Herzog, supra note 161, at 597-98 (correlation between education and decision
to migrate for economic opportunity). Further, indigent migration mirrors that of the general
population. See US. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (1989) (No.
430, Series P-20) (covering period March 1986 to March 1987).
163. See US. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 162.
164. Studies indicate that "the data... [does] not lend support to the theory that California
has a larger percentage of its population on AFDC because eligible families are moving to
California in order to take advantage of higher grant levels." LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE FACTS & FIGURES 53 (1984).
165. See LANSING & MUELLER, supra note 161, at 345-46; De Jong & Donnelly, supra
note 161, at 342; Schlottmann & Herzog, supra note 161, at 597-98. All three studies found
that the unemployed were not deterred from moving out of a state by knowing that that state
paid a relatively higher welfare benefit, and that the receipt of AFDC in a high-benefit state did
not play a significant part in the decision to choose not to migrate to another state with greater
job opportunities but lower AFDC benefits.
Of course to find that benefit levels play no part whatsoever in a decision to relocate is
unrealistic. However, as noted in Shapiro, implicit in these durational residence requirement
schemes
is the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of securing higher wel-
fare benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not take this consid-
eration into account. But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a
new life for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she
considers, among other factors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a
mother is no less deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order
to take advantage of its better educational facilities.
Shapiro, 394 US. at 631-32.
166. See Schlottmann & Herzog, supra note 161.
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Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) families.' 67 By this
measure, Alaska, Connecticut, Vermont, Hawaii, and California are tra-
ditionally the five highest benefit states. 168 Yet, a strikingly different
ranking is obtained if the states are compared based on "disposable"
grant levels-defined by combining the state AFDC grant with the state
food stamp grant and subtracting from that total the average fair market
rent for a two-bedroom apartment in the state.1 69 Some so-called high-
benefit states fall significantly in these rankings.170 California, for exam-
ple, which ranks fifth in absolute dollar amount of aid falls into thirtieth
place on this "relative benefit" scale. 7 ' The state provides only $100 in
combined AFDC plus food stamps minus fair rental value, 172 which is
well below the national average of $138. 173 Likewise, Connecticut and
Vermont, traditionally considered high-benefit states, drop from their
top-five ranking.174
Thus, not only do states misperceive the magnetic effect of welfare
programs, they also often misidentify themselves as high-benefit states by
focusing only on the absolute dollar amount of their welfare grants rather
than benefit levels adjusted for relative cost of living. Proponents of the
welfare magnet theory could argue that using an adjusted ranking system
167. Benefit level is traditionally measured by dollar amount of the grant for a typical fam-
ily situation. A family of three is statistically the most common AFDC family. See MICHAEL
S. WALD, THE STANFORD CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND YOUTH,
WELFARE REFORM AND CHILDREN'S WELL-BEING 14 (1992). Approximately 71-74% of
AFDC families have two or fewer children. STATISTICAL SERVS. BUREAU, DEP'T OF SOCIAL
SERVS., AFDC CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY, STUDY MONTH OF JANUARY 1992 (1992) (Pro-
gram Information Series Report No. 1992-02) (hereinafter DSS CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY).
168. Ranked by dollar grant to families of three, the five highest benefit states are: Alaska
($924); Connecticut ($680); Vermont ($673); Hawaii ($666); and California ($663). WALD,
supra note 167, app. B, at 43.
169. This Comment adopts a ranking system based on figures provided by the Stanford
Center for the Study of Families, Children, and Youth. See id. Though this system does not
completely account for the difference in cost of living in the different states, it is an easily
figured statistic which approximates the cost of living. Id.
170. Based on "disposable grant levels," the highest benefit states are ranked: Alaska
($634); Georgia and Hawaii ($377); West Virginia ($334); Wisconsin ($278); and Utah ($258).
The national average is $138. Id.
171. This drop in ranking is due mostly to the low amount of state food stamp aid and the
high rental value in the state. See id at 15, app. B, at 43. Though this drop is exacerbated by
high rental values in Los Angeles, San Diego, and Orange Counties, which drive up the state
rental average, Los Angeles County constitutes 30% of California's AFDC caseload. Id. at
15.
However, utilizing fair rental value is especially appropriate in California, since only 12%
of the state's AFDC families live in public housing or receive housing subsidies, ranking Cali-
fornia 50th in the nation. Id at 11.
172. Id at app. B, at 43.
173. Id
174. Id.
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is misleading because potential immigrants are likely to be aware of only
the absolute benefit level in the new state. Census data, however, does
not bear out the welfare magnet theory.175 Potential migrants are either
more sophisticated-and take into account cost of living-or welfare
benefits are not a controlling factor in their decision to migrate.
Further, even if accurate, enacting a durational residence require-
ment in response to the welfare magnet problem is constitutionally im-
permissible. As noted in Shapiro v. Thompson:
[T]he purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot
serve as [a] justification for the classification created by the
one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally
impermissible. If a law has 'no other purpose... than to chill
the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those
who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently
unconstitutional.' 
176
Thus, barring indigents from entry into the state-even if to remedy the
perceived welfare magnet effect of the state-is impermissible.
In dicta the Shapiro Court also indicated that narrowing such a law
to bar only indigents who enter for the sole purpose of receiving higher
benefits is also impermissible. The Court noted that "a State may no
more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits
than it may try to fence out indigents generally." 177 Thus, the welfare
magnet theory, even if not illusory, is not a permissible state goal-re-
gardless of its facial appeal. As such, any legislation based on a constitu-
tionally impermissible goal must be invalid, regardless of the level of
scrutiny applied by the reviewing courts.
Moreover, new residents generally comprise a very small percentage
of the state welfare rolls. For example, California census data indicates
that in 1989, approximately seven percent of those who received public
assistance were residents of another state during the previous year.17
This closely parallels California's growth rate.179 Thus, new residents
are not being drawn to the so-called high-benefit states because of the
benefit levels, and those who do migrate are relatively few. The welfare
magnet theory is mostly myth and certainly does not justify singling out
175. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
176. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
177. Id. at 631-32.
178. WALD, supra note 167, at 30; see also Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 517 n.4
(E.D. Cal. 1993) (6.6% of state AFDC caseload resided within another state within year
before applying for aid in California).
179. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 162.
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a class of citizens for specific discriminatory treatment. To the extent
that the new breed of durational residence requirements are based on the
constitutionally impermissible objective of deterring immigration of indi-
gent individuals into the state, these requirements must be invalid.
B. Discrimination Against Indigent New Residents
There has been a long and unique nexus between indigence and the
right to travel. As long as there has been a right to travel, that right has
been denied to indigents. While William Blackstone and the English
common-law tradition recognized a right to travel,' there was at the
same time a strong common-law right of the sovereign to exclude pau-
pers."'1 Such discrimination is exemplified by the Elizabethan Poor Law
of 1601,182 which allowed relocation of burdensome indigent
individuals.183
The American colonies adopted this same pattern of discrimina-
tion. 8 4 The Articles of Confederation, the first American source for the
right to travel, reflects the impact of the English common-law tradition
of exclusion:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and in-
tercourse among the people of the different States in this Union,
the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds
and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of free citizens in the several states, and
the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other state .... "I
Also, the colonial states had systems of "warning out" in which indigent
individuals were essentially relocated back from whence they came.1
8 6
Not surprisingly, most of the major right to travel cases have in-
volved indigent individuals and an attempt to exclude them. In Edwards
180. See supra note 39.
181. For a discussion of this area of the law, which is beyond the scope of this Comment,
see Berger, supra note 41, at 853-54; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American
Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L. REv. 175, 177-83 (1955); Rosenheim, supra note 49, at 307-
13; Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official
Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 635-38 (1992).
182. 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2 (Eng.).
183. See Corbett, supra note 159, at 20; Riesenfeld, supra note 181, at 177-83; Rosenheim,
supra note 49, at 307-13.
184. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 628 n.7; see Corbett, supra note 159, at 20; Riesenfeld, supra note
181, at 177-83; Rosenheim, supra note 49, at 307-13; Simon, supra note 181, at 638-39.
185. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, para. 1 (1781) (emphasis added).
186. See DOUGLAS L. JONES, VILLAGE AND SEAPORT 43, 47 (1981); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 20, 130 (1992); see also JOSIAH BENTON,
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v. California "7 the Court invalidated a California law that discouraged
migration of indigents into the state by making it a crime to knowingly
bring, or assist in bringing, indigent nonresidents into the state.18 8 Also,
Shapiro dealt with durational residence requirements for the receipt of
welfare aid.189 Thus, the English Poor Law, the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the early colonial laws, and the case history all demonstrate a desire
by the states to keep indigent individuals at bay.190
C. Public Dissatisfaction with the Welfare System
Another impetus behind current welfare reform is general dissatis-
faction with the workings of the welfare system. 9 ' Those who study the
system find that it is inadequate to meet the needs of the individuals it
WARNING OUT IN NEw ENGLAND (1992); Corbett, supra note 159, at 20; Riesenfeld, supra
note 181, at 177-83; Rosenheim, supra note 49, at 307-13.
Some commentators have used this historic discrimination to argue that durational resi-
dence requirements are constitutional simply because the states have always done it. See Ber-
ger, supra note 41, at 855-61.
187. 314 US. 160 (1941).
188. Id. at 174. The Court invalidated § 2615 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code, which provided that "[e]very person, firm or corporation or officer or agent thereof that
brings or assists in bringing into the state any indigent person who is not a resident of the state,
knowing him or her to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 171.
189. See supra part II.B.
190. Also, though not traditionally a suspect class for equal protection purposes, see TRIBE,
supra note 47, §§ 16-35 to 16-37; see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663
(1966), new resident indigents are nevertheless subject to some of the problems suffered by
members of suspect classes. The historical animus-as discussed above-is certainly a trait
that new resident indigents share with members of suspect classes. New resident indigents are
at best only virtually represented in the state political process. They more than likely were not
in the state when such laws were passed, and thus must rely only on the good will of current
residents not to discriminate against them. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938); see also Arnold H. Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theory of Equal Pro-
tection, 57 N.C. L. Rv. 1, 42-43 (poor are analogous politically to racial minority).
191. Welfare programs are seen as a drain in an era of "me first" thinking and as a public
service that few in the politically active majority need to draw on. Yet another problem is the
stereotype of the welfare mother as being very young and having many children. Though to be
eligible for AFDC funds, the household must be led by a single parent and that parent is
usually the mother, a vast majority of these mothers are between 20 and 39 years old. WALD,
supra note 167, at 13-14. Only 7.7% of female recipients are under 20 years old and only
1.8% are under 18. Id. at 14. Also, unlike the common stereotype, most AFDC families are
small, with 70% of the households having only one or two children. Id. Only 4% of the
households have five or more children. Id.
334 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
was designed to protect. 192 Recipients find the system demeaning.193
Critics worry that the current structure encourages individuals to rely on
welfare when they could otherwise be self-sufficient, discourages recipi-
ents from working, allows some recipients to remain in the system longer
than necessary, and fails to provide a route to self-sufficiency for those in
the system.1 94 This dissatisfaction has heightened the need for legislation
perceived as welfare reform.
Since dissatisfaction with welfare is high, and the welfare magnet
theory seems intuitively correct, it is hardly surprising that little objec-
tion is made to legislative decisions enacting durational residence re-
quirements. All of these factors-belief in the illusory welfare magnet
theory, historic discrimination against out-of-state indigents, and public
dissatisfaction with welfare programs-combine to make the enactment
of durational residence requirements an inviting idea.195 It is against the
backdrop of these assumptions, facts, and trends that any analysis of cur-
rent durational residence requirements must be made.
192. Children receive approximately 70% of all AFDC and general assistance funds.
WALD, supra note 167, at 3. In fact, AFDC payments provide-depending on the method of
measurement-as little as 37% of the United States median family income. See PATRICIA
RUGGLES, DRAWING THE LINE: ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 44-46 (1990). For a discussion of the difficulty of measuring pov-
erty and the poverty line, see id.; Robert Haveman, Changing the Poverty Measure: Pitfalls
and Potential Gains, Focus, Winter 1992-1993, at 24.
193. WALD, supra note 167, at 5.
194. See generally id. (discussing problems with welfare system); The New Welfare Debate:
What the States Are Hoping to Accomplish, AM. ENTERPRISE, March/April 1992, at 16, 17
(Editor's Report) (welfare condones complacency and passiveness and robs individuals of dig-
nity and self-respect).
195. Some have ascribed the resurgence of welfare cuts to the recent recession. See, e.g.,
Kosterlitz, supra note 159, at 271 (recession-racked states conducting experiments to make
poor behave more responsibly); The New Welfare Debate, supra note 194, at 16 (economic
conditions explain current welfare reform). Interestingly, however, the Wisconsin durational
residence requirement was proposed at a time when the state economy was booming: Unem-
ployment was the lowest it had been in 15 years, there was an influx of light industry, and the
AFDC case load was on the decline. See Secter, supra note 159, at Al.
However, like the welfare magnet theory, the isolated fact of a recession is both too simple
an explanation and too difficult a theory to analyze in a statistical sense. Instead, the need to
tighten the budgetary belt, the general public dissatisfaction with the welfare system, the myth
of the state as a "welfare magnet," the historically low value placed on transient indigents, and
the political ease of continuing disenfranchisement of this group better explains the resurgence
of durational residency requirements. Also, the fact that the Court today is perceived as more
conservative seems to have encouraged the revival of durational residence requirements. See
Baker et al., supra note 26, at 23 (Wisconsin governor believes durational residence require-
ments will be upheld because Court more conservative).
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IV. ANALYSIS
This part first classifies the various possible alternative durational
residence requirements into four types based on the way they compare to
the statutes at issue in Shapiro. 96 This part then analyzes each type to
determine whether they constitute a penalty on the right to travel. 9 In
so doing, this part considers the recent cases that have addressed new
durational residence requirements. Finally, this part addresses the appli-
cation of rational basis review in the event strict scrutiny does not
apply.
1 98
A. Types
For ease of classification and analysis, the current state durational
residence requirement statutes can be divided into four separate types,
based on the way they compare to the statutes at issue in Shapiro.199
These statutes have two variables: (1) the length of the waiting period
(the "time variable"); and (2) the amount of the deprivation (the "level
variable"). For example, the statutes in Shapiro had no aid (level varia-
ble) for one year (time variable). The types outlined below are based on
the way the different states have manipulated these variables in order to
avoid strict scrutiny.
1. Type I
Type I includes statutes that exactly mirror those in Shapiro. Such
statutes do not reduce either the time variable or the level variable. They
deny all welfare aid to new residents for one year. In 1988 Indiana re-
vived a statute of this type."°° This type also includes statutes that are
more severe than those in Shapiro, such as those that have waiting peri-
ods longer than one year.
196. See infra part IV.A.
197. See infra part IV.B.
198. See infra part IV.C.
199. This classification system is used because, though the current Court might have upheld
the statutes in Shapiro if presented with them today, most states are trying to distinguish their
new statutes from those at issue in Shapiro. Thus, this Author has simply adopted the bench-
mark that the states themselves have seemingly chosen-Shapiro. The game the states are
playing is not "Will the new Court overrule Shapiro?" but instead, "Is my statute different
enough from Shapiro to avoid strict scrutiny?"
200. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-2-1-5(a) (Bums 1988). This statute was declared unconstitu-
tional in 1989. See Eddleman v. Center Township, 723 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Ind. 1989); infra part
IV.B.1.
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2. Type II
Type II includes statutes that shorten the time variable but do not
alter the level variable. In other words, these statutes have a waiting
period of less than one year but still mandate total denial of benefits dur-
ing that period. In 1987 Wisconsin enacted a statute of this type.2°
3. Type III
Type III includes statutes that lessen the level variable but do not
change the time variable from those at issue in Shapiro. These statutes,
in short, maintain the one-year waiting period, but provide some-
though less than all-of the benefits to new residents during that year.
Type III has two subsets: (1) type IIIA, which provides that all new
residents receive a fixed dollar or percentage amount that is less than the
amount received by other residents; and (2) type IIIB, which provides
that new residents receive various reduced levels of aid, usually based on
the level of aid the individual received in his or her previous state. Thus,
type IIIB results in new residents receiving levels of aid that differ from
the amount of aid received by both older residents and other new resi-
dents from different states. Illinois is presently attempting to enact a
type IIIA statute.202 California has enacted a type IIIB statute,23 and
Wyoming is attempting to do so as well. 2 4
4. Type IV
Type IV includes those statutes that both shorten the time variable
and reduce the level variable. This type also has two subsets that corre-
spond to those for type III: (1) type IVA, which has both a shorter wait-
ing period and provides some benefit, but that reduced benefit level is
equal for all new residents; and (2) type IVB, which also has a shorter
waiting period and provides some benefit, but that reduced benefit is not
necessarily equal between all new residents, since, as in type IIIB, the
new reduced level of aid is fixed usually by the amount of aid received by
the individual in his or her previous state of residence. This category is
the most problematic because both variables are being altered. Seem-
ingly, this is the path states should choose if they want their statutes to
201. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.015 (West 1987). This statute was upheld as constitutional in
1992. Se Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992); infra part IV.B.2.
202. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 23.
203. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West Supp. 1993). This statute was declared
unconstitutional in 1993. Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993); infra part
IV.B.3.
204. See Wiseman, supra note 14, at 25.
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differ as much as possible from those at issue in Shapiro. However, this
may still not guarantee rational basis review. Minnesota has enacted a
type IVA statute.20 5
B. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Though Shapiro itself did not illuminate why strict scrutiny was
triggered, subsequent cases defined the parameters of the test.2" 6 The
Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County 2 07 focused on the "se-
verity of the deprivation."2 8 Unlike restrictions on divorce209 or even
civil service preferences,210 virtually any denial of welfare funds will
work a severe hardship upon the new resident. The question remains,
however, whether this hardship constitutes a "penalty," and thus triggers
strict scrutiny. It is this "severity of the deprivation" prong that deter-
mines when strict scrutiny applies,21 and it is that prong that guides this
analysis.
1. Type I
Type I statutes mirror those at issue in Shapiro.212 Because of their
close factual similarity to Shapiro, stare decisis demands that such stat-
utes be subject to strict scrutiny. But, stare decisis aside, independent
205. MINN. STAT. § 256D.065 (Supp. 1991). This statute has since been declared unconsti-
tutional. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); infra part IV.B.4.
206. See supra part II.C.
207. 415 US. 250 (1974).
208. See supra part II.C.3.
209. See supra part II.C.4.
210. See supra part II.C.6.
211. The severity of the deprivation analysis must be done regardless of the basis of the
right to travel analysis-unless one uses Zobel's "rational basis first" method. See supra part
II.C.5. Even if Justice O'Connor's Privileges and Immunities analysis is adopted, see supra
notes 133-36 and accompanying text, presumably there would be some point at which the
burden on the right to travel would be so small as to not trigger heightened scrutiny. Thus, the
penalty must be analyzed.
However, some commentators find the penalty analysis simply an "illusion of a principled
judicial framework," and would discard it. See Note, Durational Residence Requirements
from Shapiro Through Sosna" The Right to Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 622,
669 (1975). Others find penalty analysis difficult to conduct and propose a bright-line test:
Durational residence requirements for state benefits are only permissible to the extent they
prove domiciliary intent; all other uses of durational residence requirements for state benefits
are unconstitutional. See William Cohen, Equal Treatment for Newcomers: The Core Mean-
ing of National and State Citizenship, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 9, 19 (1984). Nevertheless, the
penalty analysis has been applied continuously since its inception in Shapiro. See supra parts
II.B-C. This Comment follows that tradition and assumes that penalty analysis within the
Equal Protection Clause is the proper framework to test the validity of current durational
residence requirements.
212. See supra part IV.A.l.
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analysis also requires that type I statutes be subject to strict scrutiny. As
in Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, the deprivation suffered by the new
resident under a type I statute is total-there is no aid for a set period.
Also, as in those cases, the utility of the benefit denied is substantial. t3
Being deprived of all ability to afford the basic necessities of life is a
severe deprivation. In terms of dollar amount, type I statutes tend to
work the most severe deprivation,2" 4 because by definition no other type
denies as much aid for as long. Thus, independent analysis confirms
what stare decisis commands-type I statutes trigger strict scrutiny be-
cause they penalize the right to travel.
In Eddleman v. Center Township of Marion County,215 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana addressed the
constitutionality of a type I statute. The statute at issue conditioned re-
ceipt of township "poor relief" on three years of continuous residence
within the state and one year of continuous residence within the
county.2" 6 Following Shapiro the District Court found the Indiana dura-
tional residence requirement to be facially unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 1 7 and enjoined
the township from enforcing its provisions.21 8
The court, however, was not required to test the outer boundaries of
when strict scrutiny should apply because of the factual similarity to
Shapiro. Though the court laid out the constitutional test,2 19 both par-
213. See Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 259-61 (finding governmental privileges or benefits
necessary to basic sustenance have greater constitutional significance); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627
(stressing importance of necessities of life).
214. For example, person A lives in state Y, which provides $750 per month in state aid.
Person A then moves to state X, which provides $1000 per month in state aid, but also has a
durational residence requirement. For each type of durational residence requirement, the dep-
rivation in dollar amounts, based on the listed terms of the statute, would be as follows:
Type Terms Old Resident New Resident Deprivation
r--- 1 year, no aid $12,000 $0 $12,
II 6 mos., no aid $12,000 $6000 $6000
IiA 1 year, 60% aid $12,000 $7200 $4800
IIIB I year, old aid $12,000 $9000 $3000
IVA 6 mos., 60% aid $12,000 $9600 $2400
IVB 6 mos., old aid $12,000 $10,500 $1500
215. 723 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
216. See id. at 86 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 12-2-1-5(a) (Bums 1988)).
217. The court applied strict scrutiny, relying on the conclusion in Shapiro that "any classi-
fication which serves to penalize the exercise of [the constitutional right to travel], unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."
Id at 88 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634).
218. Id at 90.
219. The court stated:
Whenever testing the constitutionality of a state statute under the equal protection
clause, courts analyze three factors concerning the law: the classes established by the
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ties "agreed that [the statute] must be subject to strict scrutiny and that it
fails this test,"220 presumably because the state offered no compelling
interest.221
The court, noting that the controlling case law was "old and well-
established, '2 22 found that the requirement penalized the exercise of the
fundamental right to travel. The court held that the statute on its face
"groups poor relief applicants into two classes based only on whether the
applicant has recently travelled interstate. Shapiro v. Thompson . . .
clearly mandates that this clause be struck down as unconstitutional.
'2 3
Though the court in Eddleman failed to do a complete "severity of
the deprivation" analysis, it reached the proper result by relying on stare
decisis. Strict scrutiny was triggered and the statute failed to pass mus-
ter. Thus, under either a full-fledged Memorial Hospital analysis, or by
reliance on stare decisis, type I statutes must be subject to strict scrutiny,
and, as is well settled by Shapiro, must fail that test.
2. Type II
States enacting type II durational residence requirements have tried
to avoid strict scrutiny by shortening the length of time that new resi-
dents are deprived of welfare aid.224 Taking what is seemingly a logical
step, these states have gambled that shortening the length of the waiting
period will sufficiently reduce the severity of the deprivation so that they
no longer penalize the right to travel.
Proponents of type II statutes argue that reducing the length of the
deprivation removes a durational residence requirement from the realm
of strict scrutiny.225 They argue that because the Court in Shapiro did
law, the interests of the persons affected by the classification, and the importance of
the governmental interest the statute was intended to further.... Statutes that class-
ify persons on the basis of inherently suspect criteria ... and statutes that infringe on
the exercise of a fundamental right are subjected to a higher level of judicial scru-
tiny--"strict scrutiny."
Id. at 87.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 90. In fact, the state of Indiana withdrew its appearance from the case, stating
that it "has no legal interest," further indicating that "there is indeed no compelling govern-
mental interest furthered by the statute." Id at 90 n. 11.
222. Id. at 87.
223. Id. at 89 n.8. Interestingly, this is the second time that Shapiro has been used to
invalidate this particular Indiana statute. In 1970, following the Shapiro decision, a three-
judge panel of the district court in Major v. Van DeWalle, No. 4169 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 1970),
permanently enjoined the Portage Township trustee from enforcing the statute. Eddleman,
723 F. Supp. at 88.
224. See supra part IV.A.2.
225. See, eg., Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).
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not hold all residence requirements unconstitutional per se,226 it im-
pliedly endorsed some durational residence requirements. This position
has several problems.
First, the language in footnote twenty-one of Shapiro does not sup-
port this type of analysis. The problematic footnote states:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tui-
tion-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession,
to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote
compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other,
may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional
right of interstate travel.227
This footnote does not state that different types of deprivations of welfare
aid may not be a penalty on the right to travel. Instead, the footnote
distinguishes residence requirements for welfare from residence require-
ments for other benefits provided from the state. Thus, Shapiro itself
provides no direct indication that a shorter duration would change the
analysis in any significant way. Of course, this understanding does not
mean that a shorter period cannot avoid strict scrutiny, but simply that
Shapiro itself does not provide such an argument; any references to the
Shapiro decision in this way are inaccurate.
Also, comparisons to Shapiro in this regard are problematic, doing
no more than begging the very question they attempt to answer. Saying
that a shorter waiting period is less onerous than those at issue in Shapiro
is misleading. Such reasoning presumes that Shapiro is in some way an
outside measurement: that the one-year statutes in Shapiro mark the
outside boundary of acceptability.228 Thus, simple comparisons to the
length of the waiting period alone do not distinguish type II statutes from
226. Shapiro, 394 US. at 638 n.21.
227. Id.
228. To understand the flaw in this reasoning, consider the following example: Assume
that river X has a pollution level of 365 particles per thousand, rendering the river dangerous.
After clean up efforts, the pollution level is reduced to 60 parts per thousand. Certainly this is
a large reduction. However, stating that the river is now clean enough as to no longer be
dangerous is to presume something we do not know: What is the maximum tolerable level of
pollution? Stating simply that the river is now less filthy does not necessarily make it clean, If
the maximum acceptable level of pollution is 20 parts per thousand (or even zero parts per
thousand), then the reduction from 365 to 60-while a reduction of over 80%-does not make
the contaminated river uncontaminated.
So too with Shapiro. Shapiro simply says, to continue the analogy, that the river is pol-
luted. It does not say how polluted. It gives no indication how much of a reduction-if any-
will make the river clean.
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the Shapiro statutes in a meaningful way, and certainly do not warrant
avoiding strict scrutiny.
The question is not how much less burdensome type II statutes are
as compared to those in Shapiro, but whether the remaining burden con-
stitutes an impermissible penalty. In Shapiro the Court asked if the stat-
utes at issue burdened the right to travel. That same question must be
asked again, and simple comparison to the statutes in Shapiro does not
provide an answer.
Instead, the focus must be on that which is denied.229 Certainly,
type II statutes lessen the burden on new residents if that burden is mea-
sured purely in total dollars denied or in total time without the entitle-
ment. Take for example a hypothetical new resident A of state X.
Assume state X pays $1000 per month in welfare aid. Under a Shapiro-
type statute, A would be denied $12,000 of welfare aid. Under a type II
statute, such as the sixty- day residence requirement of Wisconsin, 230 new
resident A would be denied $2000 of aid. Though less, this does not
answer whether or not the existing deprivation constitutes an undue bur-
den on the right to travel.
Further, focusing strictly on the dollar amount of the deprivation is
not a proper measuring stick. The importance of each of these dollars is
almost impossible to measure.231 In the example above, the fact that new
resident A is deprived of $10,000 less under a type II statute does not
change the fact that for two months he or she cannot afford the basic
229. Some argue that welfare is a privilege not a right, and is provided gratuitously by the
state. Since the state does not have to provide welfare, the argument runs, it can deny it where
and when it so desires. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-
Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987, 996-
99 (1975) ("[Flailing to offer benefits that would make the state a more attractive place does
not in any ordinary sense constitute penalizing those who travel [or] inhibiting [those who do
not]."). This type of "rights-privileges" distinction, however, is no longer valid constitutional
doctrine, having given way to the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540 (1984) (holding that certain rights cannot be deprived
except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures, and that "bitter with the sweet" ap-
proach misconceives constitutional guarantees); see TRIBE, supra note 47, § 10-8, at 680-82;
see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982); supra part II.C.5. However, the continued
validity of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is in doubt. See TRIBE, supra note 42,
§ 10-8, at 681 n.29.
230. See infra notes 232-47 and accompanying text discussing Jones v. Milwaukee County,
485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).
231. For example, in California the combined AFDC and food stamp grant equals only
94% of the poverty line. WALD, supra note 167, at 8. In fact, members of the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means concluded that people with incomes at the poverty line often do not
have enough money for basic survival. Id. at 9. Thus, even incremental reductions from a
grant level that is set below the poverty line will be very serious, greatly magnifying the utility
of each of these dollars to the recipient.
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necessities of life. Being denied the funds necessary to meet the bare
necessities of life for even a relatively short time can have significant im-
pact, and thus impose a burden on the right to travel. Thus, it is the
qualitative impact of the deprivation, not the simple manipulation of the
time element alone, that is dispositive. Because of the severity of total
denial of welfare funds, reducing the length of that deprivation merely
reduces the level of the deprivation from unconscionable to
unconstitutional.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently considered a type II statute
in Jones v. Milwaukee County.232 The challenged statute denied all gen-
eral assistance benefits to new residents for the first sixty days of their
residency.23 3 The Wisconsin circuit court ruled the statute unconstitu-
tional,234 but the state supreme court reversed.235 Though the Wisconsin
Supreme Court very acutely identified the core problem of the Shapiro
analysis, 236 the court, in a very brief passage, held that "the 60 day wait-
ing period at issue here is so substantially less onerous than the one-year
waiting period of Shapiro, that it does not operate to penalize an individ-
ual's right to travel. '2 37  This bald statement was the entirety of the
court's reasoning behind not applying strict scrutiny.238 As explained
above, however, this simple comparison of the length of the waiting peri-
232. 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).
233. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.015 (West 1987). The statute does allow for several exceptions,
such as medical emergency or extraordinary hardship, coming to join a close relative, coming
to accept a bona fide job offer, or having in the past resided in the state for one year. Id.
234. See Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 22.
235. Id
236. The court noted:
The threshold question is whether the 60 day waiting period penalizes an individual's
right to travel such that it must be shown that the waiting period promotes a "com-
pelling" state interest under the strict scrutiny standard... "Although any durational
residence requirement impinges to some extent on the right to travel, the Court in
Shapiro did not declare such a requirement to be per se unconstitutional.... The
amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not
made clear."
Id. at 25 (quoting Memorial Hosp., 415 US. at 256-57). The court, however, was very aware
of its entrance into uncharted waters. See id. at 26; infra note 248.
237. Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 26. Unfortunately, this comparison of Shapiro is flawed. The
court treated Shapiro's one-year requirement as some type of minimum requirement for trig.
gering strict scrutiny. The court performed no analysis of the severity of the penalty, or its
impact on the individual deprived, nor did it address whether the deprived individual has been
irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining the benefit. Also, the majority ignored the language in
Soto-Lopez, see discussion supra note 141 and accompanying text, that even temporary depri-
vations of significant benefits may impose an impermissible burden on the right to travel. The
court merely relied on the qualitative difference between 60 days and one year, performing no
analysis within the Soto-Lopez/Memorial Hospital framework. See supra note 228 and accom-
panying text for a deeper criticism of the problems with this type of analysis.
238. See Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 25-26.
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ods, without more, does not sufficiently distinguish this statute from Sha-
piro so as to avoid strict scrutiny.
The court in Jones then applied rational basis review, holding the
statute constitutional under the proposed justification of encouraging em-
ployment.23 9 Though the court noted that this may not have been the
best or wisest solution, it stated that it was not for the court "to pass
judgment as to the wisdom of the legislature." 2"
Chief Justice Heffernan's dissent in Jones provided more detailed
analysis. Taking the majority to task for using Shapiro's language that
not all waiting periods are penalties on the right to travel,2 4 1 the Chief
Justice correctly noted that "[n]othing in Shapiro indicates that the
length of the residence requirement measured impact on the right of in-
terstate travel. Rather, it is the nature of the right or interest im-
pinged."242 Chief Justice Heffernan conceded that, even if length of the
requirement was a relevant factor, because the statute "was intended to
deter migration,"243 it thus deserved strict scrutiny,2" under which, fol-
lowing the reasoning in Shapiro, it must fail.24 The Chief Justice found
that the sixty-day waiting period was in fact a penalty on the right to
travel, stating that "sixty days without food and shelter is no less devas-
tating than one year without food and shelter."246 The dissent noted that
though "Wisconsin's need to avoid being a 'welfare-magnet' may well be
significant, ... it is insignificant in a constitutional analysis under prece-
dents we are obliged to follow.)
247
The Jones decision is a poor addition to the jurisprudence of the
right to travel. While the court decided that a sixty-day waiting period
does not trigger strict scrutiny, it was lax in not spelling out its reason-
239. Id. at 26-27.
240. Id. at 27.
241. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
242. Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 28 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). Also, see the discussion of this
very point at supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
243. Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 29 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 29-30 (H-effernan, C.J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 30 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). Quoting the lower court, Heffernan stated:
The issue is not whether 60 days is a reasonable time period, but whether such a
delay in the provision of aid to which the applicant is otherwise entitled constitutes a
penalty on the right to travel .... These basic necessities of life are viewed with
greater constitutional significance, and the withholding of such assistance constitutes
a penalty on the plaintiff's right to travel.
Id. at 29-30 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). The chief justice relied on the reasoning in Memo-
rial Hospital that even temporary deprivations of necessities of life impose a penalty on the
right to travel. Id (citing Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 29).
247. Id. at 30-31 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 169-74 for a discussion of
the "welfare magnet" theory.
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ing.24 8 Moreover, the majority failed to consider the Memorial Hospital
element of the right to travel analysis, and thus left unanswered the ques-
tion of what triggers strict scrutiny.249
3. Type III
States enacting durational residence requirements of this type have
attempted to avoid strict scrutiny by providing some level of aid to new
residents without shortening the time of the deprivation from the statutes
at issue in Shapiro.250 Presumably, states adopted this approach hoping
that by providing some aid their statutes will not serve to impermissibly
burden the right to travel. This approach, too, is flawed.
Both type IIIA and IIIB provide new residents with less than the
amount of aid given to older residents. Both type IIIA and IIIB suffer
from the same problem as type II: Strictly focusing on the dollar value of
the deprivation is misleading.251 Consider once again the hypothetical
new resident A. Under a type IIIA statute providing sixty-percent bene-
fits to new residents for their first year in state X, which provides $1000
per month, new resident A would be deprived of $4800.252 Under a type
IIIB statute providing benefits at the level of new resident A's previous
state-assume A came from a state that provided $750 per month in
aid-A would be deprived of $3000.253 These new statutes are certainly
"less burdensome" than a Shapiro-type statute, which would deny A the
full $12,000, in that at least A is not totally deprived of welfare aid. But,
as with type II statutes, the question remains: Is the current deprivation
a penalty? The simple fact that a new statute takes fewer dollars away
from a new resident does not in and of itself dictate that the new statute
is not an impermissible burden on the right to travel.
248. The court in Jones essentially threw up its hands in frustration and gave up on trying
to figure out the parameters of the admittedly confusing Shapiro analysis. The majority noted
"that the Supreme Court itself recognizes the unsettled nature of the amount of impact neces-
sary to give rise to the [strict scrutiny] standard, and that the parameters of Shapiro's penalty
analysis admittedly remain undefined." Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 26. After this disclaimer, the
court baldly stated that the waiting period was constitutional. Id.
249. The majority in Jones did not address this issue. It simply noted that Memorial Hospi-
tal did not make the test clear and proceeded to ignore the "severity of the deprivation" analy-
sis. Id at 25-26.
250. See supra part IV.A.3.
251. See supra note 231 and accompanying text for a discussion of this problem.
252. Twelve thousand dollars per year to which older residents are entitled minus 12
months at $600 per month which A receives.
253. Twelve thousand dollars per year to which older residents are entitled minus 12
months at $750 per month for A.
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Again, the problem of dollar utility arises. As with type II statutes,
the value of each dollar that A receives below that which is necessary to
provide for the basic necessities of life is increased. 254 If A is one dollar
short of paying rent, A has no shelter. If A is one dollar short of being
able to purchase food for his or her children, they go hungry. Already,
welfare in most states does not even provide poverty level income.255
Thus, reducing this entitlement any further works a severe burden on the
new resident-a burden that penalizes the right to travel. Thus, provid-
ing sixty percent of the necessities of life should prove as futile as total
deprivations limited to a short period of time. As with other durational
residence requirements, type III statutes should continue to trigger strict
scrutiny.
California has recently enacted a type IIIB statute.25 6 The Califor-
nia statute limits new residents to the level of aid they received in their
old state for their first twelve months of California residency.257 The
district court recently addressed the California statute in Green v. Ander-
son 25 8 and found it unconstitutional.
25 9
The district court in Green found that the California durational resi-
dency requirement 2 60 constituted a penalty on migration. 261 The court
stated that "[a]lthough the [statute] does not eliminate all AFDC bene-
fits, it produces substantial disparities in benefit levels and makes no ac-
commodation for the different costs of living that exist in different
states. '2 62 The court noted that simply providing some aid will not nec-
essarily save the statute from strict scrutiny.2 6 3
The court also stressed that the relevant comparison is not between
recent residents of California and residents of other states, but between
bona fide California residents.2 64 The fact that a new resident does not
receive a dollar reduction in payments, the court stated, is not rele-
254. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 231.
256. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West Supp. 1993).
257. The statute provides: "Families that have resided in this state for less than 12 months
shall be paid an amount ... not to exceed the maximum aid payment that would have been
received by that family from the state of prior residence." Id.
258. 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
259. Id. at 523.
260. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03.
261. Green, 811 F. Supp. at 521.
262. Id.
263. The court noted that "[i]n Memorial Hospital the measure was not saved because it
pertained to some but not all medical services, so, too, this measure is not constitutional be-
cause it materially diminishes, without entirely eliminating, AFDC benefits." Id.
264. Id. The court stated that had the comparison been between recent residents and resi-
dents of other states:
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vant.265 The statute penalizes migration because it treats recent residents
differently than other California residents.2 " Moreover, in addressing
the differences in cost of living,267 the court stated that the statute "can-
not fairly be said to provide the same payment as new residents could
have received in the state of their prior residence.
268
Finding strict scrutiny triggered, the court turned to the proffered
state interests and found them lacking.269 The court found the statute
sensibly designed if its goal was to deter migration, 270 but, following Sha-
piro, stated that such a purpose was unconstitutional. 271 Addressing the
goal of saving costs, the court found unpersuasive any argument that new
residents, constituting 6.6% of the state's AFDC caseload, 2  are better
able to bear a reduction in benefits than other residents.2  The court
noted finally that, "[s]tripped of the unconstitutional purpose of deter-
ring migration, the measure lacks a rational design. 274
Thus, type III statutes, in particular type IIIB statutes, which create
even more groupings of residents, should trigger strict scrutiny. Though
these statutes do not totally deny aid, under Memorial Hospital,275 par-
tial or temporary denial of necessities of life-which certainly includes
welfare aid-may penalize the right to travel and thus trigger strict scru-
tThe result in Zobel would be inexplicable since no other state provided a bounty to
its citizens and thus Alaska treated new residents better in this respect than residents
of other states. Similarly, it was of significance in Memorial Hospital that the non-
emergency care provided by Maricopa County may have been much superior to the
medical care provided elsewhere.
Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 521 n.13.
268. Id. at 521. Thus, the court highlighted a common problem underlying enactment of
durational residence requirements-simple-minded focus on strict dollar amount of payments.
See supra part III.B for the impact of this problem on the welfare magnet theory.
269. Green, 811 F. Supp. at 522.
270. Id. The court also noted that there is evidence that this was the true goal of the
statute. See id at 522 n. 14.
271. Id. at 522.
272. Id. at 518 n.4.
273. Id. at 522.
274. Id. The court indicated that the statute could possibly have failed even rational basis
review when it advised the state that it "may seek to conserve resources by reducing welfare
benefits to all recipients or to some recipients on some rational, non-discriminatory basis. But
unless the purpose here is to deter migration, there is no other rational basis for the distinction
drawn among applicants all of whom are California residents." Id. at 523. See infra part
IV.C.3 for a discussion of rational basis review of these statutes.
275. See supra part II.C.
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tiny. Type III statutes, where the time period is still one year, as in Me-
morial Hospital,276 should also trigger strict scrutiny review.
4. Type IV
Type IV statutes both shorten the duration of the denial and give
some percentage of aid during that shortened period.277 Though this
type may seem the most likely to avoid strict scrutiny, it nevertheless
encounters the same problems of types II and III. As discussed above,
the time of the deprivation should not be significant in determining the
penalty when that deprivation is total.278 Also, providing part of the aid
still fails to provide the basic necessities and thus is a penalty.27 9 Simply
combining these two variables should not solve the problem that they
could not solve alone.
Type IV offers the attractiveness of a potential solution. This type
significantly reduces the comparative dollar amount of the deprivation
from Shapiro.280 Again considering hypothetical new resident A, in a
state that has a type IVA statute providing sixty percent of the state aid
for the first sixty days, A would be deprived of only $800.281 Compared
to the denial of $12,000 under a Shapiro -type statute, or $2000 under our
hypothetical type I, or $4800 under our hypothetical type IIIA, this is
certainly less of a strict balance-sheet burden.
However, for two months, A is still deprived of the necessities of life.
Though the state may come close to meeting them, they are not met.
Again, two-thirds of the cost of rent still deprives the individual of shel-
ter. This is an impermissible burden. Strict scrutiny should be triggered
by such a statute. Of course, type IV1B brings with it the additional prob-
lem of type IIIB discussed above.282
The Minnesota statute held unconstitutional by the state court of
appeals in Mitchell v. Steffen283 is an example of a type IVA statute.284
That statute provided that all new residents who have resided in Minne-
276. See supra part II.C.
277. See supra part IV.A.4.
278. See supra part IV.B.2.
279. See supra part IV.B.3.
280. See supra note 214.
281. Twelve thousand dollars per year for old residents minus two months at $600 plus 10
months at full benefits.
282. See supra part IV.B.3.
283. 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
284. See id.
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sota less than six months receive sixty percent of the aid given to older
residents.28 5
Mitchell involved the constitutionality of a recently amended statute
that provided that an applicant for state aid without minor children who
has resided within the state less than six months receives sixty percent of
the amount available to other residents of longer duration.28 6 The statute
also provided that if the applicant received aid in his or her previous state
of residence, he or she is entitled to only the lesser of either the benefit
level of the applicant's former state or the normal Minnesota benefits.287
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the legislative debate
on these amendments "focused on the concern of legislators that people
move to Minnesota in order to collect higher public assistance
benefits.
2 8
In upholding the lower court's grant of summary judgment against
the statute, the court in Mitchell applied classic Shapiro reasoning. Cit-
ing the test summarized in Soto-Lopez, the court found that the statute
on its face discriminated between residents 28 9 and that the right to travel
had been burdened.290 The court, citing Memorial Hospital, rejected the
state's claim that actual proof of deterrence was required.291 In addition,
relying on the legislative history of the amendment, the court found the
legislature's intent to deter migration constitutionally impermissible, as
in Shapiro.292 Also, the court used a practical determination to judge if
the deprivation of the benefit constituted a penalty. The court found that
the reduced benefits were "insufficient to provide for the basic necessities
of life."'293 The court also rejected as impermissible the other state justifi-
285. MINN. STAT. § 256D.065 (Supp. 1991).
286. Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at 899 (referring to MINN. STAT. § 256D.065). This is a varia-
tion of a type IVA residence requirement. See supra part IV.A.3.
287. Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at 899 (referring to MINN. STAT. § 256D.065). This is a varia-
tion of a type IVB residence requirement. See supra part IV.A.4.
288. Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at 900. See supra part III.A for a review of the misperceptions
that cause this type of legislation.
289. Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at 901.
290. Id. at 902.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. The court, following Memorial Hospital, noted that "[t]he fact that the statute
reduces, rather than eliminates, benefits does not change the conclusion that it is an unconsti-
tutional penalty on the right to travel." Id. It further noted that "where a residency require-
ment involves governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance, even
temporary deprivations or reductions tend to be severe and work serious inequities among
otherwise qualified residents." Id. at 902-03.
Though no writing prior to this Comment has reviewed this approach, it is a safe guess
that it will come under criticism, because it is normally the province of the legislature to
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cations of protecting the public fisc and making "receipt of public assist-
ance benefits a neutral factor in an individual's decision to move to the
state.
, 294
The court, in dicta, went further. The court reasoned that even if
the objectives had been permissible, they would have failed the "nar-
rowly tailored" requirement.295 Because a Minnesota study found that
only 6.4% of new public assistance recipients moved to Minnesota be-
cause of higher benefit levels, the statute was overbroad in that it reduced
the benefits of all new residents.296 The court also noted that even if not
overbroad, there were other methods of achieving the desired goals,
which not only were more efficient but were less burdensome on the right
to travel.297
C. Rational Basis Analysis
States will be disappointed even if they are successful in skirting
strict scrutiny, since the new state durational residence requirements
must still pass rational basis review.2 98 That may not prove to be as easy
as the states are assuming. Though normally a very deferential standard,
this test, particularly in the right to travel area, still retains some teeth.2 99
In the right to travel area, none of the governmental interests advanced
in support of durational residence requirements have been found to be
determine what constitutes the "basic necessities of life," and the cost of supporting those
necessities.
294. Id. at 903.
295. Id.
296. Id. Both the Minnesota legislature and courts had access to a local study done con-
cerning indigency, migration, and welfare. See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., WEL-
FARE MIGRATION STUDY: A REPORT TO THE 1991 LEGISLATURE (1991). See supra part
III.A for a discussion of the statistics and data that underlie public policy making in the area
of welfare.
297. Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at 905. Further, the court noted that the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV was not implicated because the discrimination was between classes
of residents, not between residents and nonresidents. Id. The court thus effectively rejected
Justice O'Connor's opinions in Zobel and Soto-Lopez. See supra parts II.C.5-6 for a discussion
of Justice O'Connor's position.
298. To pass rational basis review, the critical inquiry is whether a rational legislature could
believe a legitimate governmental goal is being served. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 16-2; see
also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 US. 221, 230 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 US. 166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 US. 297, 303 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
US. 1, 40-44 (1973).
299. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See supra part II.C for a discussion of
Zobel.
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legitimate, except for the interest in promoting employment. 300 How-
ever, even that interest is unlikely to save these statutes because of their
inherent irrationality. 30' Thus, the new state durational residence re-
quirements should fail even rational basis review.
1. Type I
Type I statutes should fail rational basis review for several reasons.
First, since the underlying principles that lead to the adoption of dura-
tional residence requirements for the receipt of welfare aid are not based
on reason-but instead on erroneous stereotypes-by definition no ra-
tional legislature could believe it was serving a legitimate governmental
goal by legislating based on these stereotypes. Also, if the goal is encour-
aging employment, then a durational residence requirement makes little
sense. New residents usually constitute a statistically small percentage of
indigents.302 There is no rational reason why this group specifically
should be targeted and "encouraged" to find employment while the rest
of the indigent individuals in the state are not.3 °3
These statutes do not show an intent to encourage employment-
since a more contrary means of reaching that goal could hardly be
imagined-but instead show a desire to keep the poor from exercising
their constitutional rights. For these reasons, type I statutes should fail
even rational basis review.
2. Type II
Even if the Jones court correctly determined that the length of the
deprivation can be reduced enough to avoid strict scrutiny,3 4 type II
statutes have an additional problem: The shorter the statute makes the
waiting period in an attempt to avoid strict scrutiny, the less rationally
related the statute becomes to the goal of encouraging new residents to
seek employment. Although perhaps new residents are more motivated
to find employment during the waiting period, they need only hold out
300. See Shapiro, 394 US. at 631-38 (finding governmental interests to be not only not
compelling but also not legitimate); supra part II.B; see also Zobel, 457 U.S. 55 (finding state
statute failed even rational basis review). The only legitimate governmental interest appears to
be promoting employment. Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Wis. 1992).
301. The Jones decision, allowing the state interest of encouraging employment to sustain
the durational residence requirement at issue in that case, is flawed and should not be emu-
lated. See supra notes 232-49 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
303. See infra part IV.C.2 for a more complete discussion of the goal of encouraging
employment.
304. See supra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
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for a short period of time. After the short waiting period, the new resi-
dent has no further "incentive" to find employment for the rest of his or
her stay as a resident of the state, and is free to be unemployed. Cer-
tainly a state must be more concerned with an individual's long-term
employment for the many years of his or her residency, not merely the
first year-or even less-of residence.30 5
The new resident is instead being punished for moving into the state.
By not giving a new resident the support he or she needs while looking
for a job, the state actually decreases the likelihood that he or she will
find one. Rationally, if the state were truly concerned with promoting
employment, it would provide a safety net of welfare for a brief time
upon arrival, such as six months, so that an individual could seek a job
and then would stop giving welfare aid to those who had not found em-
ployment. Denying aid at the outset does not rationally further the goal
of encouraging employment. Thus, even if a type II statute could theo-
retically avoid strict scrutiny, it should not be able to pass muster under
rational basis review.
3. Type III
Type III statutes will also have problems passing rational basis re-
view. These statutes share the general problems of type I, in that they
are aimed at a statistically small group.3 6 Also, as with type II statutes,
the deprivation is at the front end of a citizen's residency, which is not
rationally related to encouraging employment.30 7
Type IIIB statutes, however, have an additional problem. Not only
do these statues already divide similarly situated residents based upon
how recently they exercised their right to travel, they also divide simi-
larly situated new residents into groups based on their prior state of resi-
305. In fact, some states have a durational residence requirement and a statute reducing aid
for those recipients who remain on AFDC for an extended period of time. This demonstrates
further that the real purpose behind these statutes is deterring migration of indigent individu-
als-an impermissible goal. See infra note 307.
306. See supra part IV.C. 1.
307. See supra part IV.C.2. Though California passed its durational residence requirement
separately, it was part of a welfare reform package-Proposition 165-that was defeated by
state voters. That proposition included-along with the durational residence requirement-a
provision reducing aid by 15% to all recipients still receiving aid after six months, which was
drafted as an incentive to welfare recipients to obtain employment. If encouraging employ-
ment is truly the goal of the durational residence requirement, however, it is hard to under-
stand why the legislature adopted two different means to achieve that goal: For new residents
it decided to deny aid at the outset, yet for the welfare population at large, it decided to deny
aid only after a period of extended dependency. Thus, unless indigent new residents somehow
deserve double incentive to become employed, this demonstrates that deterring migration is
actually the goal of the durational residence requirement, not encouraging employment.
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dence. California, which has such a statute, would pay different benefit
levels to new residents based on their old entitlement.30 8 California pro-
vides $663 per month to old-resident, three-person families.30 9 New resi-
dents from Texas would receive $184 per month;310 those from Ohio
$334 per month;3 11 those from New York $577 per month;3 12 and those
from Alaska, which provides $924 per month,313 would receive $397.80
per month because residents from states that give aid in levels greater
than the California entitlement receive sixty percent of the California
payment.31 4
This division, based on one's prior state of residence, is irrational. It
needlessly imposes yet another grouping on similarly situated new resi-
dents. Such a scheme is the product of faulty assumptions about the
state as a welfare magnet. 315 The type IIIB scheme is adopted because
legislators worry that new residents who move to the state from lower-
aid states will receive a windfall.316 For example, a Texan who moves to
California under a type IIIA plan that gives new residents sixty percent
of the state grant goes from receiving $184 per month to receiving
$397.80 per month. The legislators perceive this as a windfall of $213.80.
Thus, they enact type IIIB statutes to prevent Texas residents from being
tempted by this "windfall." This reasoning, however, is irrational. It is
not this supposed "gain" that a potential new resident will focus on, but
instead the difference between what they will be paid and what it costs to
live in the state. The increase is only a gain if the cost of living stays
constant between the two states.31 7 Because welfare grants are tied to the
poverty level within the state, moving from state to state, regardless of
any illusory dollar gain, will keep the individual at approximately the
same point in relation to the poverty line.
Thus, the type IIIB solution makes no sense. The cost of living is
the same for all new residents in California. However, new residents re-
308. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West Supp. 1992). See infra notes 309-17 and
accompanying text. The court in Green, though indicating the statute lacked a rational basis,
did not make this additional distinction regarding the irrationality of further subdivision of
new residence based on prior state residence. See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 517-
23 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
309. WALD, supra note 167, app. B at 43.
310. Id. at 11.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03.
315. See supra note 159.
316. See supra note 159.
317. This observation was made by the district court in Green, 811 F. Supp. at 521 n.13,
which considered a statute of this type. See supra notes 258-74 and accompanying text.
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ceiving differing levels of aid are placed at various points on the spectrum
of aid based solely on their prior state of residence. This type of statute
causes those from states with lower welfare aid to bear an even greater
penalty on the right to travel simply because the cost of living was lower
in their prior state. Type IIIB statutes, thus, simply prove that encourag-
ing employment is not their true goal; that instead they are aimed at
discouraging migration of indigents. Type IIIB statutes are most certain
to be subject to strict scrutiny because of the additional inequitable dis-
crimination among new residents, as well as most certain to lack a ra-
tional basis to encouraging employment, and thus be found
unconstitutional.
4. Type IV
Though the type IVA statute in Mitchell v. Steffen 3 18 was subjected
to strict scrutiny, because statutes of this type usually work the lowest
dollar amount deprivation, they seemingly have the greatest chance of
avoiding strict scrutiny. However, under rational basis review, statutes
of this type share the same problems as types I, II, and III."' Also, type
IVB statutes share the same problem as type IIIB-they group new resi-
dents into subgroups based on state of prior residence. 320 In fact, type IV
best highlights the dilemma states face in adopting the new breed of du-
rational residence requirements: The more they whittle away at the time
variable and the level variable in order to avoid strict scrutiny, the more
irrational the resulting statute seems, minus the unconstitutional goal of
excluding indigents. Thus, even if type IV statutes can avoid strict scru-
tiny, they should fail rational basis review.
V. CONCLUSION
Some twenty years after Shapiro, the courts have again been asked
to consider the constitutional validity of durational residence require-
ment statutes limiting welfare aid for new state residents. These new
statutes have been craftily drafted in the hope that they will be able to
circumvent the fatal strict scrutiny review utilized in Shapiro,321 and are
aimed at the heart of the vagueness in the right to travel analysis: When
is a durational residence requirement a penalty on the right to travel?
Although the right to travel has had a long and confusing history, 322 and
318. See supra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
319. See supra parts IV.C.1-3.
320. See supra part IV.C.3.
321. See supra note 159.
322. See supra part II.A.
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although the penalty analysis introduced by Shapiro for testing dura-
tional residence requirements remains undefined,323 the new durational
residence requirements are unconstitutional for several reasons.
First, to the extent that these requirements are based on a desire to
fence out indigent individuals, the new durational residence requirements
must be unconstitutional regardless of the level of scrutiny applied to
them. 24 One thread that has clearly run through the otherwise unclear
history of the right to travel analysis is the imnpermissibility of deterring
migration of individuals, indigent or not.325 To uphold a statute based
on this goal alone would require the abandonment of years of precedent.
Second, though aimed at avoiding strict scrutiny, the new breed of
durational residence requirements should fail to do so. The proper test
for the application of strict scrutiny is the penalty analysis introduced in
Shapiro,326 expanded in Memorial Hospital,327 and restated in Soto-Lo-
pez.328 Although there is no fundamental right to receive welfare pay-
ments,329 conditioning receipt of such aid on the length of an individual's
residence in a particular state is a penalty on the right to travel. 330 The
fact that welfare aid is critical to indigent individuals means that any
discrimination that reduces benefit levels-even marginally-is a severe
deprivation that constitutes a penalty.331 Thus, the new batch of resi-
dence requirements-regardless of type-should be subject to strict scru-
tiny. And when strict scrutiny is applied, these statutes must fail for lack
of a compelling state interest.332 That result is truly well-settled.
Third, even if strict scrutiny is not applied, the factual assumptions
forming the foundation of these statutes are so weak that they should
crumble even under rational basis review.333 The welfare magnet theory
is misleading, 334 and the alleged goal of promoting employment is easily
unmasked.335 In fact, the more states try to avoid strict scrutiny by re-
323. See supra parts ILB-C.
324. See supra part III.A.
325. Shapiro, 394 US. at 631; see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; supra part II.
326. See supra part II.B.
327. See supra part II.C.3.
328. See supra part II.C.6.
329. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US. 471, 484 n.16 (1969); see supra part lI.C.
330. See supra part IV.B for an analysis of whether the various types of state durational
residence requirements trigger strict scrutiny and how they fare under strict scrutiny, once
triggered.
331. See supra notes 213, 229-31 and accompanying text.
332. See supra part IV.B.
333. See supra part IV.C.
334. See supra part III.A.
335. See supra part IV.C.2; supra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
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ducing the deprivation of their statutes, the more they reveal their true
motive-the desire to keep indigent individuals out of the state-and the
less rationally related they are to any proffered governmental interests.
This desire to exclude indigents, though persistent throughout history,
has been held clearly unconstitutional and should spell doom for the
newly arisen durational residence requirements.
States may seek to conserve resources by reducing welfare benefits
to all recipients, or to some on a rational, nondiscriminatory basis,336 but
durational residence requirements are not such a basis. Durational resi-
dence requirements, though facially appealing, cannot survive in the wel-
fare context.
Clark Allen Peterson *
336. See, e.g., Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 523 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (listing possible
state alternatives to durational residence requirements).
* This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Allen and Gisela, and my brother, David. I
would like to thank Professor Christopher May of Loyola Law School for his inspiration and
guidance, the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their sound advice
and meticulous work, my family for everything, and my old roommate Gretchen Helfrich who
now knows more than any nonlaw student-and arguably more than any law student-ever
needs to know about the right to travel.
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